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iPreface
This report is the final product of my master’s thesis in RAMS-engineering at the NTNU. The
thesis-project started January 2015 and was finalised June 2015.
The thesis-project started as a collaborative project between a private owned Norwegian
company and me. Due to organisational and communication issues, I decided to discontinue
the collaboration. This decision was made after consulting my supervisor, professor Marvin
Rausand. This meant I was forced to re-define my scope of work midway my thesis period. As a
result, this report presents a more theoretical contemplation of the topic than initially planned
for.
The report is written for readers that have interest in how European legislation regarding es-
sential healthy and safety requirements is structured and how a manufacturer of machinery can
meet these requirements. Special attention is given to safety integrity requirements for control
systems, how these requirements can be systematically used in the design process for machines,
and how integrity of the control system can be assessed. This approach towards safety integrity
for control systems might be of special interest for readers that are known with general con-
cepts of safety integrity presented in standards such as the IEC61508, but are new to machinery
sector’s specific standards.
It is assumed that the reader is known with the standard IEC61508, and has background
knowledge of reliability theory equivalent to that presented by Rausand and Høyland (2004).
Trondheim, 26-6-2015
Peter Joos Louwe Kooijmans
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Summary and Conclusions
This project had two phases. The first phase was of an exploring nature and had as main ob-
jectives to (1) give an introduction to the machinery directive, its structure, and main safety
requirements with special focus on requirements regarding safety-related control systems, to
(2) give an introduction to functional safety, to (3) present the two competing standards IEC
62061 and ISO 13849, highlighting their similarities and differences, and to (4) present current
issues within the design of reliable and safe control system for machinery. The second phase
focused on current issues within the design of reliable and safe control systems for machinery.
It had as main objectives to (1) give an in-depth analysis of the issue regarding safety-functions
that operate in continuous mode and to (2) present concepts and solutions that might be used
to resolve the issues regarding safety-functions that operate in continuous mode.
Phase one
The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC is European legislation that promotes free movement of
machinery within the EU and guarantees a high level of protection of the EU workers and cit-
izens. It does this by dictating essential health and safety requirements relating to the design
and construction of machinery. It is the manufacturer’s responsibility to assess if the machinery
meets the requirements from the Machinery Directive. Guidance on how to meet the require-
ments from the Machinery Directive is provided by harmonized standards. During the project,
the standards have been analysed. It is concluded that at the core of achieving safety of ma-
chinery lies a risk based approach. This risk based approach is described in the standard ISO
12100:2010; "Safety of machinery - General principles for design - Risk assessment and risk re-
duction". It specifies principles of risk assessment and risk reduction. The part of machine
safety which depends on the correct functioning of active control and safety systems is called
functional safety. Control systems that contribute to functional safety are in general referred
to as safety-related control systems. These systems provide the required risk reduction and are
an integral subset of the machine. The Machinery Directive imposes requirements regarding
the safety and reliability of control systems. ISO 13849-1: "Safety of machinery - Safety-related
parts of control systems" and IEC 62061: "Safety of machinery- Functional safety of safety-related
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electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems", specify requirements for the
design and implementation of safety-related control systems. ISO 13849-1 introduces the con-
cept of Performance levels (PL) and the IEC 62061 adopts the concept of Safety Integrity Levels
(SIL). Both concepts are studied and it shows that both concepts use methods and tools to es-
tablish the risk that needs to be reduced, and give guidance and requirements on designing
systems that shall reduce the risk. Some oddities within the standards are researched and ex-
plored. It is concluded that, although the standards might show guidance, the designer of the
control system needs to assess whether they are applicable on the system at hand. Throughout
the first phase of the project it became clear that in both standards the phenomenon of basic
control systems that conduct safety-related control functions that operate in continuous mode
(SRCFcont.) is underexposed. SRCFcont. means that the function is continuously controlling the
machinery. Their failure results in a hazardous event that may lead to harm.
Phase two
To reduce risk of a certain hazardous event, it is common practice to add safety barriers (safety
functions) to machinery. Throughout the second phase of the project it became apparent that
incremental adding of safety barriers as promoted in the ISO 12100, ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061,
leads to inaccurate safety integrity assessments of safety barrier sequences that consist out of at
least one SRCFcont.. This may lead to inaccurate reliability requirements for barriers during the
design of such barrier sequences.
To develop a method that results in a more accurate safety integrity assessment of such sys-
tems, this thesis proposes an integral approach. Instead of assessing the safety integrity of each
individual safety barrier in the sequence, the safety integrity of the full barrier sequence is as-
sessed. The approach is based on modelling the full barrier sequence and establishing the value
of the risk metric "Hazardous event frequency" (HEF). Once the HEF is found, this can be eval-
uated if this HEF is deemed to be acceptable or not.
During the project a model of such a system is constructed. It does not yet include common
cause failures nor is it checked. The model is therefore not completed nor validated. Still, initial
simulation shows plausible results and it is a promising start for further research into complet-
ing the integral method.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When designing a system, it is important that it fulfils all requirements from relevant laws and
regulations. These requirements are mainly related to health and safety aspects of the system.
The basic safety requirements for systems that are placed on the EU market are described in the
EU Directives. An EU Directive is legislation that is binding for the member states of the EU.
The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC applies to new machinery products that are placed on
the EU market. This directive has as objectives to promote free movement of machinery within
the EU and guarantee a high level of protection of the EU workers and citizens.
Product safety requirements, in the directives, do not only apply to the final product. They
are related to the whole life cycle of the product, from early conception until disposal. It is
the manufacturer’s responsibility to document the activities taken to ensure that the safety is
adequate and show that his product meets all relevant requirements. Detailed risk analyses
of the product in the various life phases are sometimes required, and the risk analysis reports
may have to be part of the product documentation. To help manufactures comply with these
requirements, a comprehensive framework of harmonised standards is available.
As a result of automation, demand for increased production and reduced operator physical
effort, safety-related control systems of machines play an increasing role in the achievement
of overall machine safety by reducing the risk of hazardous events. The machinery directive
imposes general requirements regarding the safety and reliability of control systems. In line with
these general requirements, both the standards ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 specify requirements
for the design and implementation of safety-related control systems. The methods developed
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in both of these standard differ, but when correctly applied, can achieve a comparable level of
risk reduction. Both standards adopt the strategy for risk reduction presented in ISO 12100.
A guideline for how to conduct a risk assessment is presented in the technical report ISO/TR
14121-2.
Meeting the safety requirements regarding the control system by applying one of the com-
peting standards, ISO 13849-1 or IEC 62061, will present some challenges for manufactures of
machinery. These challenges lay in conducting a fitting risk assessment to determine the ap-
propriate risk reduction a control system needs to deliver, and a correct interpretation of the
architectural and reliability requirements stated in the standards. This requires a good under-
standing of the machinery under control, knowledge of the hazardous events that may occur,
possible safety functions that may be applied, architectural constrains, reliability calculations
and how to interpret component reliability data.
A fair amount of literature and guidelines is available that offer tools and methods to design
control systems that meet the safety requirements. The European Union has published a guide-
line on how The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC should be interpreted and what specific stan-
dards can be applied to meet the basic safety requirements. This guideline is available on the
website of the European Union http://ec.europa.eu. Technical report ISO/TR 18569; "Safety
of Machinery - Guidelines for the understanding and use of safety of machinery standards", shows
how harmonised standards that are part of the supporting standard framework can be applied.
Authors such as Rausand (2011) present methods and guidance on how to conduct risk assess-
ments that are in-line with the ISO12100. Specific literature on functional safety show how from
a risk assessment the required integrity/performance of a control system can be established.
Examples are Rausand (2014) and Rockwell (2011). Besides this, the IEC has published the tech-
nical report IEC/TR 62061-1:"Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 in the
design of safety-related control systems for machinery", that gives a short introduction and brief
comparison of the competing standards.
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1.1 Objectives
To demonstrate the challenges a manufacturer might meet during the design of a machine, the
project is divided into two parts. The first part of the report is of an exploring nature. Its main
goal is to show the relation between the applicable legislation, requirements and standards. It
introduces the concept of functional safety and a general description of modern control sys-
tems. It highlights current issues within the field of safety integrity of control systems. The sec-
ond part will elaborate on the described issues and suggest how these issues might be resolved.
Part one
The objectives of part one are to:
1. Give an introduction to the machinery directive, its structure, and main safety require-
ments. Special focus shall be given to requirements to safety-related control systems.
2. Give an introduction to functional safety.
3. Present the two competing standards IEC 62061 and ISO 13849 and highlight similarities
and differences between these two standards.
4. Present current issues within the design of reliable and safe control systems for machinery.
Part two
With the objectives of the first part met, the second part of the project has the objectives to:
1. Give an in-depth analysis of the issue regarding safety-functions that operate in continues
mode.
2. Present concepts and solutions that might be used to resolve the issue regarding safety-
functions that operate in continues mode.
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1.2 Limitations
• When referring to the requirements that originate from european legislation, only those
from the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC are listed. It might well be that other require-
ments from other EU directives apply to control systems of machinery as well.
• Description and explanation of methods, concepts and procedures that are given in stan-
dards, is limited. When possible, reference to specific chapter, clauses and appendices to
standards are made. If the author believes there are points of interest within the standards,
these will be discussed.
• As it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the IEC 61508, the report will not explain
the methods and concepts that are described in this standard in detail. When possible,
the differences between the machinery sector specific standards and the IEC 61508 are
highlighted.
• Examples of systems used in the report are based on generic equipment. The data in this
report are taken from accredited databases.
• When failure rates are used, they are assumed to be constant. If otherwise, the failure
distribution is given
• When calculating the reliability of systems that are presented in examples, only the failure
probability contribution from random hardware failure is considered. The contribution
of systematic failures, human factors and alternative testing mechanisms are not consid-
ered.
• When calculating the reliability of systems that are presented in examples, the β-factor
model for contribution of common cause failure is adopted.
1.3 Approach
The thesis project is structured and conducted by the following activities:
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1. Literature research: To understand the machinery directive, its structure and main re-
quirements, a literature research into legislation is conducted. This research is the basis
for further understanding of the framework of standards that support the directive. More
literature is read and analyzed on the topics;
• standards ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061,
• system analysis,
• modern control systems,
• risk assessment,
• and functional safety.
2. Familiarisation with current issues in the field of safety integrity of control systems: With
the knowledge gained from the literature research, problem areas are explored. Fitting
examples and cases are described that highlight the problems at hand.
1.4 Structure of the Report
The rest of the report is organised as follows. Part one of the report starts at chapter two. Chap-
ter two introduces the machinery directive, its structure and the main safety requirements. It
describes the relation between the directive and the supporting harmonised standards, the re-
quirements for the technical file and the CE-marking. It ends with illustrating the process of
compliance.
Chapter three elaborates on the harmonised standards. It explains how they are organised
and shows how systematic risk reduction is established by applying the processes described in
the harmonised standards.
With the introduction to relevant legislation and standards in place, chapter four focuses on
specific requirements regarding the control system. It introduces the term functional safety and
relevant concepts. Standards ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 are discussed and compared.
Part two of the report starts of with a short conclusion of part one, highlighting the problem
areas and issues regarding assessing the safety integrity of control systems within the machinery
sector. Chapter five expands on the issue of safety-related control functions that operate in
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continuous mode. It shows the problem at hand by giving examples of problems that may arise
when designing such control functions.
Based on the problems described in chapter five, chapter six introduces a solution to the
problem that is sketched in chapter five. It gives a modelling solution.
Chapter seven presents the results, recommendation, the conclusion and recommendation
for further work.
Part I
The Machinery Directive & safety and
reliability of control systems.
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Chapter 2
Legislation and Requirements
The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC promotes free movement of machinery within the EU and
guarantees a high level of protection of the EU workers and citizens. Free movement of ma-
chinery that complies with the Machinery Directive is guaranteed by article 6 of the directive.
This article forbids member states to prohibit, restrict or impede the placing of machinery that
comply with the directive on their markets. The high level of protection of the EU workers and
citizens is ensured by the dictated essential health and safety requirements relating to the de-
sign and construction of machinery. Which products are considered as machinery and are part
of the Machinery Directive’s scope, is described in Article 1 of the directive. All these products
need to meet the essential health and safety requirements relating to the design and construc-
tion of machinery that are listed in Annex I of the Machinery Directive. The requirements are
listed as followed;
1. General remarks,
2. control systems,
3. protection against mechanical hazards,
4. required characteristics of guards and protective devices,
5. risk due other hazards,
6. maintenance,
9
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7. information.
Some supplementary requirements are listed for specific product groups such as foodstuffs ma-
chinery and machinery for cosmetics or pharmaceutical products.
2.1 Compliance
It is the manufacturer’s responsibility to assess if the machinery meets the requirements from
the Machinery Directive. Guidance on how to meet the requirements from the Machinery Di-
rective is provided by harmonized standards. Machinery manufactured in conformity with a
harmonised standard, shall be presumed to comply with the essential health and safety require-
ments covered by such a harmonised standard.
The procedure for assessment of conformity varies with product categories. For non-dangerous
machines the conformity assessment is done with internal checks. The general requirements for
this assessment are described in Annex VIII of the Machinery Directive. These are;
1. For each type of the series of machinery, the manufacturer shall draw up a technical file,
2. The manufacturer must take all measures necessary in order that the manufacturing pro-
cess ensures compliance of the manufactured machinery with the technical file and with
the requirements of this Directive.
Dangerous machines
The Machinery Directive lists dangerous machines in Annex IV. For these machines a different
conformity procedure is required. Within these procedures an important task lies with Notified
Bodies. These are bodies notified by EU member states and carry out the assessment of confor-
mity of dangerous machines. This is done by conducting the EC type-examination procedure,
as described in Annex IX of the Machinery Directive, or indirectly by a full quality assurance
procedure that is certified by a notified body. This procedure is described in Annex X of the
directive.
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Where the machinery is listed and manufactured in accordance with the harmonised stan-
dards, and provided that those standard cover all of the relevant essential health and safety re-
quirements, the manufacturer shall apply one of the following procedures:
1. the procedure for assessment of conformity with internal checks on the manufacture of
machinery, provided for in Annex VIII;
2. the EC type-examination procedure provided for in Annex IX, plus the internal checks on
the manufacture of machinery provided for in Annex VIII;
3. the full quality assurance procedure provided for in Annex X. This Annex describes the
conformity assessment of machinery referred to in Annex IV, manufactured using a full
quality assurance system, and the procedure whereby a notified body assesses and ap-
proves the quality system and monitors its application.
Where the machinery is referred to in Annex IV and has not been manufactured in accordance
with the harmonised standards, or only partly in accordance with such standards, or if the har-
monised standards do not cover all the relevant essential health and safety requirements or if
no harmonised standards exist for the machinery in question, the manufacturer shall apply one
of the following procedures:
1. the EC type-examination procedure provided for in Annex IX, plus the internal checks on
the manufacture of machinery provided for in Annex VIII, point 3;
2. the full quality assurance procedure provided for in Annex X.
Partly Completed Machinery
In case of partly completed machinery, the manufacturer of partly completed machinery shall
ensure that:
• the relevant technical documentation is prepared;
• assembly instructions are prepared;
• a declaration of incorporation shall been drawn up.
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The assembly instructions and the declaration of incorporation shall accompany the partly
completed machinery until it is incorporated into the final machinery and shall then form part
of the technical file for that machinery.
2.2 Technical file
To demonstrate that the machinery complies with the requirements the manufacturer shall
compile a technical file.
1. A technical file shall comprise:
• a construction file including:
– a general description of the machinery,
– the overall drawing of the machinery and drawings of the control circuits, as well
as the pertinent descriptions and explanations necessary for understanding the
operation of the machinery,
– full detailed drawings, accompanied by any calculation notes, test results, cer-
tificates, etc., required to check the conformity of the machinery with the essen-
tial health and safety requirements,
– the documentation on risk assessment demonstrating the procedure followed,
– the standards and other technical specifications used, indicating the essential
health and safety requirements covered by these standards,
– any technical report giving the results of the tests carried out either by the man-
ufacturer or by a body chosen by the manufacturer or his authorized represen-
tative,
– a copy of the instructions for the machinery,
– where appropriate, the declaration of incorporation for included partly com-
pleted machinery and the relevant assembly instructions for such machinery,
– where appropriate, copies of the EC declaration of conformity of machinery or
other products incorporated into the machinery,
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– a copy of the EC declaration of conformity;
• The manufacturer must carry out necessary research and tests on components, fit-
tings or the completed machinery to determine whether by its design or construction
it is capable of being assembled and put into service safely. The relevant reports and
results shall be included in the technical file.
2. The technical file referred to in point 1 must be made available to the competent author-
ities of the Member States for at least 10 years following the date of manufacture of the
machinery or, in the case of series manufacture, of the last unit produced.
The technical file does not have to be located in the territory of the Community, nor does
it have to be permanently available in material form. However, it must be capable of being
assembled and made available within a period of time commensurate with its complexity
by the person designated in the EC declaration of conformity.
The technical file does not have to include detailed plans or any other specific information
as regards the subassemblies used for the manufacture of the machinery unless a knowl-
edge of them is essential for verification of conformity with the essential health and safety
requirements.
For partly completed machinery, documentation must show which requirements of this Di-
rective are applied and fulfilled. It must cover the design, manufacture and operation of the
partly completed machinery to the extent necessary for the assessment of conformity with the
essential health and safety requirements applied. The documentation shall comprise out of:
• a construction file including:
– the overall drawing of the partly completed machinery and drawings of the control
circuits,
– full detailed drawings, accompanied by any calculation notes, test results, certifi-
cates, etc., required to check the conformity of the partly completed machinery with
the applied essential health and safety requirements,
– the risk assessment documentation showing the procedure followed, including:
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* a list of the essential health and safety requirements applied and fulfilled,
* the description of the protective measures implemented to eliminate identified
hazards or to reduce risks and, where appropriate, the indication of the residual
risks,
* the standards and other technical specifications used, indicating the essential
health and safety requirements covered by these standards,
* any technical report giving the results of the tests carried out either by the man-
ufacturer or by a body chosen by the manufacturer or his authorised represen-
tative,
* a copy of the assembly instructions for the partly completed machinery;
• a copy of a Declaration of Incorporation of Partly Completed Machinery.
2.2.1 Manual
All machinery must be accompanied by instructions in the official Community language or lan-
guages of the Member State in which it is placed on the market and/or put into service. Section
1.7.4 of Annex I describes the requirements the instructions should meet. An important subsec-
tion is 1.7.4.2. This subsections dictates what should be included in the instructions.
2.2.2 Risk reports
To demonstrate that a risk assessment is conducted, a risk report shall be compiled. When con-
ducting a risk assessment conform the ISO 12100. Guidance on how to conduct a risk assess-
ment and structure the documentations is described in ISO/TR 14121-2.
2.2.3 Declarations
The manufacturer must draw up and sign an EU Declaration of Conformity (DOC) as part of all
the conformity assessment procedure provided by the Machinery Directive.The EU DOC is the
document that states that that the product satisfies the essential requirements of the applica-
ble legislation. By drawing up and signing the DOC, the manufacturer assumes responsibility
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for the compliance of the product. Just as it is the case for the technical documentation, the
EU Declaration of Conformity must be kept for ten years from the date of placing the product
on the market. This is the responsibility of the manufacturer or the authorised representative
established within the EU. What the DOC needs to contain is described in Annex II of the Di-
rective. A copy of the DOC has to be included into the instruction manual of the machinery.
An example of a DOC is shown in Figure 2.2. The manufacturer of machinery or his authorised
representative is obligated to keep the original DOC for a period of at least 10 years from the last
date of manufacture of the machinery.
Declaration of Incorporation of Partly Completed Machinery
In case of partly completed machinery, defined as an assembly which is almost machinery but
which cannot in itself perform a specific application, not a DOC has to be drafted but a Declara-
tion of Incorporation of Partly Completed Machinery. What the Declaration of Incorporation of
Partly Completed Machinery needs to contain is shown in Annex II of the Directive. An example
of a DOC is shown in Figure 2.3
2.3 CE Marking
The CE mark, shown in figure2.1, is a mandatory safety mark on many product that are placed
on the market in the European Economic Area (EEA). This mark is a sign of conformity with
product safety requirements set out in the EU Machinery Directives. To permit the use of a CE
mark on a product, proof that the item meets the relevant requirements must be documented.
By affixing the CE marking on a product, a manufacturer is declaring, on his sole responsibility
(and irrespectively of whether a third-party has been involved in the conformity assessment
process), conformity with all of the legal requirements to achieve CE marking.
2.4 Process
The process of complying with the Machinery Directive is shown in the flowchart presented in
Figure 2.4. The figure shows two different paths. One path for Machinery and one path for partly
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completed machinery, defined as an assembly which is almost machinery but which cannot in
itself perform a specific application.
Figure 2.1: The symbol of CE marking
Figure 2.2: Example of a DOC
Rotork Sweden AB 
P.O. Box 80,  
Kontrollvägen 15 
SE-791 22 FALUN, SWEDEN 
Tel. +46 (0)23 587 00  
Fax. +46 (0)23 587 45 
 
 
 
Declaration of incorporation of partly completed machinery 
According to Directive 2006/42/EC Annex IIB 
 
 
 
Hereby declare that the following pneumatic actuators 
RC200/RCG/RCC/RC88 
 
Complies with the following essential health and safety requirements of the Directive 
2006/42/EC Annex 1: 1.1.1g, 1.1.2b, 1.1.2c, 1.1.2e, 1.1.3, 1.1.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.4, 1.3.7, 1.3.8, 1.3.8.2, 
1.4.2.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.7, 1.5.13, 1.6.1, 1.7.3. 
 
The actuator must not be put into service until the machinery into which it is to be 
incorporated has been declared in conformity with the Directive 2006/42/EC. 
 
Further assured that the partly completed machinery complies with all applicable provisions 
of 97/23/EC ”The Pressure Equipment Directive” and 94/9/EC ”ATEX-Directive”. 
 
And that the standards and / or the technical specifications provided below are applied: 
   
EN 15714-3:2009 Industrial valves – actuators – part3: Pneumatic part-turn actuators for 
industrial valves – basic requirements   
SS-EN ISO 12100-1:2003 Safety of machinery – Basic concepts, general principles for design – Part 1: 
Basic terminology, methodology 
SS-EN ISO 12100-2:2003 Safety of machinery – Basic concepts, general principles for design – Part 2: 
Technical principles 
ISO 5211:2001 and  
DIN 3337:1985 
Industrial valves – part-turn valve actuator attachments 
VDI/VDE 3845:1998 Industrial process control valves; interfaces between valves, actuators and 
auxiliary equipment  
DIN 79:2004 Squares for operating spindles and operating elements 
 
The person authorized to compile the relevant technical documentation: 
Name: Ulf Kajgård  
Business name: Rotork Sweden AB 
 
The undersigned also undertakes in transmitting information pertaining to our products, in 
answer to any adequately motivated request by a national authority. This shall include the 
method of transmission and shall be without prejudice to the intellectual property rights of 
the manufacturer of the partly completed machinery. 
 
 
 
Falun, 2009-12-29 
 
 
Ulf Kajgård, Design Manager ___________________________________   
970054 
Figure 2.3: Example of a DOC
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Figure 2.4: Flowchart of depicting the process of compliance
Chapter 3
Harmonised standards
Harmonised standards support European legislation. They (1) have been mandated by the Eu-
ropean Commission, (2) have been developed by one of the European standard bodies, (3) ad-
dress essential requirements of directives and (4) notification of their development has been
published on the Official Journal of the European Communities.
As explained by the European Commission, the standards supporting the Machinery Direc-
tive are classified into three categories:
• A-type standards: These standards specify basic concepts, terminology and design prin-
ciples applicable to all categories of machinery. Application of such standards alone, al-
though providing an essential framework for the correct application of the Machinery Di-
rective, is not sufficient to ensure conformity with the relevant essential health and safety
requirements of the Directive and therefore does not give a full presumption of confor-
mity.
• B-type standards: These standards deal with specific aspects of machinery safety or spe-
cific types of safeguard that can be used across a wide range of categories of machinery.
Application of the specifications of B-type standards confers a presumption of conformity
with the essential health and safety requirements of the Machinery Directive that they
cover when a C-type standard or the manufacturer’s risk assessment shows that a tech-
nical solution specified by the B-type standard is adequate for the particular category or
model of machinery concerned. Application of B-type standards that give specifications
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for safety components that are independently placed on the market confers a presump-
tion of conformity for the safety components concerned and for the essential health and
safety requirements covered by the standards.
• C-type standards: These provide specifications for a given category of machinery. The
different types of machinery belonging to the category covered by a C-type standard have
a similar intended use and present similar hazards. C-type standards may refer to A or
B-type standards, indicating which of the specifications of the A or B-type standard are
applicable to the category of machinery concerned. When, for a given aspect of machin-
ery safety, a C-type standard deviates from the specifications of an A or B-type standard,
the specifications of the C-type standard take precedence over the specifications of the A
or B-type standard. Application of the specifications of a C-type standard on the basis of
the manufacturer’s risk assessment confers a presumption of conformity with the essen-
tial health and safety requirements of the Machinery Directive covered by the standard.
Certain C-type standards are organised as a series of several parts, Part 1 of the standard
giving general specifications applicable to a family of machinery and other parts of the
standard giving specifications for specific categories of machinery belonging to the fam-
ily, supplementing or modifying the general specifications of Part 1. For C-type standards
organised in this way, the presumption of conformity with the essential health and safety
requirements of the Machinery Directive is conferred by application of the general Part 1
of the standard together with the relevant specific part of the standard.
A list of the standards that support the Machinery Directive are published and regularly up-
dated on the website of the European Union.
3.1 A risk based approach
At the core of achieving safety of machinery lies a risk based approach. The main concept of this
approach is described in the A-standard ISO 12100:2010; "Safety of machinery - General princi-
ples for design - Risk assessment and risk reduction." It specifies principles of risk assessment
and risk reduction. Technical report ISO/TR 14121-2:2012; "Safety of machinery - Risk assess-
ment - Part 2: Practical guidance and examples of methods", provides practical guidance on
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conducting risk assessments for machinery in accordance with ISO 12100 and describes various
methods and tools for each step in the process. The overall process of conducting a risk assess-
ment and reducing risk is shown in Figure 3.1. For a detail description on how to conduct a risk
assessment, Rausand (2011) presents different methods, tools and theoretical backgrounds.
Figure 3.1: Flowchart risk assessment process. (adapted from ISO/TR18569 (2004) and ISO-
12100:2010 (2010))
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Risk reduction
Once a risk assessment is conducted and it has been judged that the risk for an identified hazard
has not been adequately reduced, the ISO 12100:2010 promotes a hierarchal implementation of
protective measures. The order of implementation is as follows:
1. Inherently safe design measures: When reducing risk, these measures are to be imple-
mented first. These measures eliminate hazards or reduce the associated risks by a suit-
able choice of design features of the machine itself. Requirements are described in clause
6.2 of the ISO 12100. An example of an inherently safe design measure is a safety func-
tion conducted by a control system. Clause 6.2.11 of the ISO 12100:2010 refers to the B-
standard ISO 13849 and the C-standard IEC 62061.
2. Safeguarding and complementary protective measures: When it is not practicable to re-
duce risk by use of inherently safe design measures, safeguarding and complementary
protective measures can be used to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Requirements
are described in clause 6.3 of the ISO 12100:2010. Examples of these measures are emer-
gency stop equipment and fixed or interlocking movable guards. Specific B standards for
each measure is available.
3. Information for use: When risk remains, despite the application of the safe design mea-
sures and the safeguarding, the residual risks shall be identified in the information for use.
Requirements are described in clause 6.4 of the ISO 12100. The standard IEC 62079 gives
requirement and guidance for structuring and presentation of information for use.
Chapter 4
Safety and reliability of control systems
The Machinery Directive imposes requirements regarding the safety and reliability of control
systems. These are stated in Annex I, section 1.2 Control systems, clause 1.2.1 ’Safety and reli-
ability of control systems". Control systems must be designed and constructed to prevent haz-
ardous situations from arising. They must be designed and constructed in such a way that:
• they can withstand the intended operating stresses and external influences,
• a fault in the hardware or the software of the control system does not lead to hazardous
situations,
• errors in the control system logic do not lead to hazardous situations,
• reasonably foreseeable human error during operation does not lead to hazardous situa-
tions.
Particular attention must be given to the following points:
• the machinery must not start unexpectedly,
• the parameters of the machinery must not change in an uncontrolled way, where such
change may lead to hazardous situations,
• the machinery must not be prevented from stopping if the stop command has already
been given,
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• no moving part of the machinery or piece held by the machinery must fall or be ejected,
• automatic or manual stopping of the moving parts, whatever they may be, must be unim-
peded,
• the protective devices must remain fully effective or give a stop command,
• the safety-related parts of the control system must apply in a coherent way to the whole of
an assembly of machinery and/or partly completed machinery.
The first paragraph of section 1.2.1 and its 4 indents set out the basic requirements for the re-
liability and safety of control systems. The second paragraph of section 1.2.1 and its 7 indents
describe the main hazardous events and situations that must be avoided.
The ISO 12100 defines safety functions conducted by control systems as part of the inher-
ently safe design of machinery. It imposes requirements the control systems need to meet in
clause 6.2.11. This clause refers to the standards ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061.
4.1 Standards ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061
Both ISO 13849-1: "Safety of machinery - Safety-related parts of control systems" and IEC 62061:
"Safety of machinery- Functional safety of safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable
electronic control systems", specify requirements for the design and implementation of safety-
related control systems. They have been adopted by the European standardisation bodies CEN-
ELEC and CEN and have been published with the status of transposed harmonised standards
under the Machinery Directive.
The ISO 13849-1 is a type B standard and gives guidance on the design of machinery con-
trol systems in order to comply with the safety requirements of the Machinery Directive. It is
applicable on control systems based on electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic and mechanical tech-
nologies. It presents strategies and methods that are proven to design systems that avoid, detect
and/or tolerate failures in order to reduce hazardous and dangerous situations. The ISO 13849-1
is aimed at traditional electrical technology and with the introduction of more complex electri-
cal and programmable control systems, there is need for a more specific standard that uses the
concept of functional safety and safety integrity.
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The concept of functional safety and safety integrity is introduces and described in the stan-
dard IEC 61508: "Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related
systems". The IEC 62061 is the machinery sector specific standard within the IEC 61508 frame-
work. Just as the ISO 13849, it is intended to be used within the framework of systematic risk
reduction described in ISO 12100:2010. The standard gives methods and requirements to:
• assign the required measure of risk reduction for each safety-related control function to
be implemented by safety-related control systems;
• enable the design of the control system appropriate to the assigned safety- related control
functions;
• integrate safety-related subsystems designed in accordance with ISO 13849;
• validate the safety-related control systems.
4.2 Functional safety
As a result of automation, demand for increased production and reduced operator physical ef-
fort, control systems of machines play an increasing role in the achievement of overall machine
safety. The part of machine safety which depends on the correct functioning of active control
and safety systems is called functional safety. Control systems that contribute to functional
safety are in general referred to as safety-related control systems. These systems provide the
required risk reduction and are an integral subset of the machine. Figure 4.1 illustrates how a
safety-related control system might contribute to reducing risk for a specific hazardous situa-
tion.
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Figure 4.1: Risk reduction by different measures (adapted from EN-ISO13849-1 (2006))
Control systems that are safety-related conduct safety functions. ISO 12100 defines safety func-
tions. Both the ISO 13849 and IEC 62061 adopt this definition.
Z Safety function ’function of the machine whose failure can result in an immediate increase
of the risk.
Rausand (2011) distinguishes two categories of safety functions. These are:
• Safety control functions. A safety function that is a normal part of the operation of the
machinery and/or integrated into the machinery control system.
• Safety protective function. A dedicated safety function that is separate from the control
system and is only activated when the safety function is demanded. Examples are Emer-
gency Shutdown systems (ESD).
Within the ISO 12100, safety functions conducted by control systems are part of the inherently
safe design of the machine. This implies that risk reduction achieved by the control system has
precedence over safeguards, complementary productive measures and information for use.
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4.3 Safety-related control systems
The term control system is well defined. Most standards adopt a definition that is the same or
similar to the one given in ISO 13849-1:2006.
Z Control system "system which responds to input signals from parts of machine elements,
operators, external control equipment or any combination of these and generates output sig-
nals causing the machine to behave in the intended manner." (EN-ISO13849-1, 2006)
The control systems that realises functional safety by conducting safety control functions,
consist out of at least three subsystems. These are:
1. Sensor subsystem. This subsystem detects potential danger and produces an electrical
signal that is sent to a logic solver.
2. Logic solver subsystem. Detects the electrical signal exceeding a set threshold and sends
a signal to the final elements.
3. Final element subsystems. Performs the safety function.
The definitions of a safety-related control system or safety-related part of a control system is less
unambiguous. The previous mentioned ISO 13849-1:2006 does not define safety-related control
systems, but only mentions safety-related part of a control system (SRP/CS).
Z Safety-Related Part of a Control System "part of a control system that responds to safety-
related input signals and generates safety-related output signals." (EN-ISO13849-1, 2006)
This definition seems to exclude parts of the control system that conducts control functions
that contribute to risk reduction but do not respond on safety related input, such as operational
functions (e.g. starting, normal stopping). These control functions do not respond to safety-
related input as such, but are part of the inherent safety design of the machine. ISO 13849-1:2006
states that "SRP/CS may also provide an operational function", but the standard does not specify
if the safety function and the operational function can be identical.
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The standard IEC 62061 defines Safety-Related Electrical Control Systems (SRECS).
Z Safety-Related Electrical Control Systems "electrical control system of a machine whose
failure can result in an immediate increase of the risk." NOTE: A SRECS includes all parts of an
electrical control system whose failure may result in a reduction or loss of functional safety and
this can comprise both electrical power circuits and control circuits. (IEC-62061, 2006)
As opposed to the definitions of SRP/CS, this definition does imply that a control system that
conducts any function, including the operational functions of the control system, that when fails
leads to increased risk, are subsumed under SRECS and can be interpreted as a safety function.
These functions conducted by the SRECS, that are intended to maintain the safe condition of
the machine or prevent an immediate increase of the risk, are defined as Safety-Related Control
Function (SRCF).
Z Safety-Related Control Function "control function implemented by a SRECS with a speci-
fied integrity level that is intended to maintain the safe condition of the machine or prevent an
immediate increase of the risk(s)". (IEC-62061, 2006)
4.3.1 Continuous demand
The duality in function, being a process and safety function, means that the demand rate of the
safety function and the process control function is equal. When the demand for the process
control function is continuous, the demand rate for the safety function is continuous as well.
Although this train of thought is derived from the definitions given in the IEC 62061, nothing in
the ISO 13849 seems to contradict this line of thinking.
Within the IEC 61508 framework, the continuous demand for the safety function is defined
as the continuous mode. A safety function operates in a continuous mode when the the safety
function retains the machine in a safe state as part of normal operation. The fact that a con-
trol function can be regarded as safety critical and might be defined as such, has implications
for defining integrity requirements for the control function. An in-depth discussion on these
implications is presented in Part two of this report.
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4.4 Risk estimation, tolerable risk, and required risk reduction
The ISO 13849-1 and the IEC 62061 adopt the strategy for risk reduction at the machine that is
presented in ISO 12100-1:2003. The risk estimation has to be conducted conform clause 5.5 of
the ISO 12100-1:2010 as described in chapter 3. When the risk of a certain hazardous situations
is known, it needs to be established if the risk is tolerable or should be reduced. To establish
what risk is tolerable and what risk is not, nor the ISO 12100 or the ISO 14121 mentions spe-
cific methods or tools. The ISO 12100 gives very general requirements to evaluate if the risk is
tolerable and if it needs to be reduced. The approach described in clause 5.6.3: Comparison of
risk, stating; ’As part of the process of risk evaluation, the risks associated with the machinery or
parts of machinery can be compared with those of similar machinery or parts of the machinery’.
This can be interpreted as the "Globalement au moins aussi bon" (GAMAB) principle. The IEC
61508 recommends the "as low as reasonable practicable" (ALARP) principle to establish what
risk tolerable.
When the risk associated with an identified hazardous event is known, and the tolerable risk
is defined, the difference between the two is equal to the required risk reduction. If it is decided
that the required risk reduction has to be delivered by a safety function conducted by a control
system, or a hazard is introduced by the possible failure of the control system, the measure
of required risk reduction needs to be quantified. ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 introduce two
different concepts to categorize the measure of risk reduction a safety function needs to deliver.
Respectively the concept of Performance Levels (PL) and the concept of Safety Integrity Levels
(SIL).
4.5 Performance Level
ISO 13849 uses the concept of the performance of safety functions. It consists out of the required
Performance Level (PLr) and the Performance Level (PL). PLr is the performance that needs to
be met by the SRP/CS that conducts the safety functions to achieve the required risk reduction.
The PL is the discrete level used to specify the ability of safety-related parts of control systems to
perform a safety function under foreseeable conditions. The standard defines five different PLr
and PL’s, ranging from a to e. Once it is established that risk needs to be reduced with a certain
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PLr, a safety function needs to be designed that meets the corresponding PL.
Determining the PLr
Establishing PLr results from a risk assessment. The risk assessment assumes a situation prior
to provision of the intended safety function. Determination of the PLr is done by conducting a
risk graph. This method is presented in Annex A of the ISO 13849-1 and is discussed by authors
such as Baybutt (2007) and Nait-Said et al. (2008)
Safety function design and PL evaluation
Once the PLr for each hazardous event is established, the safety function(s) that will reduce the
risk needs to be designed. The PL of a safety function is determined by its quantifiable aspects
and its non-quantifiable, qualitative aspects. The quantifiable aspects are the aspects of the
SRP/CS that can be related to the hardware random failures of the system. ISO 13849 states that
the probability of these hardware random failures of the system occurring, referred to as the
reliability of the system, are determined by the following characteristics of the system:
• the Mean Time To dangerous Failure(MTTFd) value for a single component,
• the Diagnostic coverage(DC),
• the Common Caused Failures, and
• the structure of the system.
The system has to be designed in such a way that the SRP/CS meets the reliability requirements
that are set for each of the PL. As mentioned, the PL’s range from a to e. For each PL, ISO 13849
has defined the reliability requirement in terms of average probability of dangerous failure per
hour (PFH). They are shown in Table 4.1. In this case a dangerous failure is defined as:
Z dangerous failure "a failure which has the potential to put the SRP/CS in a hazardous or
fail-to-function state." (EN-ISO13849-1, 2006). It has to be noted that this definition is adapted
from IEC 61508-4:1998.
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Table 4.1: Performance levels
PL Avg. Pr. of dangerous failure/hour (PFH)
a ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4
b ≥ 3∗10−6 to < 10−5
c ≥ 10−6 to < 3∗10−6
d ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6
e ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7
The qualitative aspects of the SRP/CS are characteristics such as the behavior of the safety
function under fault conditions, safety-related software, systematic failure and environmental
conditions. The relation between the characteristics of the system and the reliability of the sys-
tem are explained in the standard. It describes a simplified procedure for estimating the PL of
a system in clause 4.5.4. Once it is established how the subsystem is structured (category B, 1,
2, 3 or 4), the the diagnostic coverage is established (low, medium, or high) and the MTTFd is
established, the achieved PL can be found. This is presented in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.2: With a MTTFd of 36 years, a structure conform cat.2 and a medium DC,
the system will meet PL d with an average probability of dangerous failure per hour of
9,39E −7. Adapted from EN-ISO13849-1 (2006)
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4.5.1 Points of interest in ISO 13849
Using MTTFd to determine reliability of safety function
ISO 13849 states that one of the characteristics of the system that has influence on the relia-
bility of the safety function is the MTTFd for the components that conduct the function. The
ISO 13849 shows and presents a simplified method on how the PL of a safety function can be
assessed. Part of this method is to calculate the MTTFd values for single components. This is
explained in Annex C of ISO 13849. All the MTTFd of the components that conduct the safety
function are then summed. This is shown in Annex D and Annex I. The MTTFd is then inter-
preted as the inverse failure rate of the exponential distribution. Meaning, that from the MTTFd
it is possible to retain the overall failure rate of the safety function and calculate the average
probability of dangerous failure per hour. Thus, estimate if a function meets the required PFH
for the corresponding PL’s, as shown in Table 4.1. Although this method is common practice,
there are some drawbacks. One of them lays in the assumption that the failure of components
is distributed exponential over time. (F (t ) = 1− exp(−λd t ). It is known that pneumatic and
electromechanical components are more likely to show a Weibull failure distribution. This is
of major influence on the evaluation of the MTTFd and therefore reliability assessment of the
safety function. This is made clear in example 4.1
Example 4.1 Manufactures of components often only give the mean number of cycles
until 10% of the components fail dangerously (B10d). In Annex C, the ISO 13849 introduces
a pneumatic valve with a mean value of 60 million cycles as B10d. Assuming the valve shows
an exponential distribution, the MTTFd of the valve is calculated to be ≈ 6∗108 cycles.
It is known that pneumatic components are more likely to show a Weibull distribution.
With some simple calculations this example shows the impact a false assumption of failure
distributions can have on the calculation of the expected MTTFd.
For Weibull the probability that an item fails within the time interval(0,t] is given as:
F (t )= 1−exp−(λ∗ t )α (4.1)
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In which λ is the scale parameter, and α the aging parameter. The MTTF for weibull can be
calculated as:
1
λ
Γ(
1
α
+1) (4.2)
Using the same valve with B10d = 6∗ 108 cycles, and a realistic α=1.2, we solve (4.1) for λ.
This gives λ= 2,55513∗10−9. Applying (4.2), with Γ( 1
α
+1)= 0.93969, results in a MTTFd of
3.6∗108 cycles.
Example 4.1 shows it is essential to understand the failure mechanisms and failure charac-
teristics of components used in safety-related control systems. Although the standard provides
guidance, the designer of the control system needs to asses if it is applicable on the system at
hand. When it is known a system component does not show exponential failure distribution,
the simplified method presented in the ISO 13849 should not be applied.
Measures against CCF
The estimation of common cause failure (CCF) is a well discussed topic. Authors such as Hauge
et al. (2013) and Rausand (2011) discuss methods on how to incorporate them in reliability stud-
ies of systems. Both ISO 13849 and IEC 62061 adopt the β-factor method. Estimation of the
β-factor for the CCF’s requires detail knowledge of the system at hand. A proven method to
estimate the β-factor, is the use of checklists. These checklists quantify the effect of measures
against CCF. By establishing if these measures are absent or present in the system design, the
β-factor is estimated. Examples of these checklists can be found in IEC 61508 and IEC 62061.
As mentioned, these checklist will give a certain β-factor that can be used in the reliability
calculations. ISO 13849 presents a check list but instead of using it to determine the β-factor, its
result is used to determine if additional measures are to be implemented into the system design
to avoid CCFs. The CCF checklist of both ISO 13849 and IEC 62061 are less extensive than the
one presented in part six of IEC 61508, but are therefore deemed more practical and of better
use for machinery design. Both checklist acknowledge that the following factors have effect on
the CCF’s of machinery:
1. Separation/Segregation
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2. Diversity
3. Design/applications/experience
4. Assessment/analysis
5. Competence/training
6. Environmental control
Each factor is accompanied with questions, that when answered get a score. IEC 62061 connects
these score to a certain value of theβ-factor. See Table 4.2. ISO 13849 uses its score to determine
if more measures should be implemented to avoid CCF’s. A score of 65 and more, according to
ISO 13849’s checklist, means no other measures need to be implemented. A score less than 65
means additional measures need to be implemented. ISO 13849 also notes that it is assumed
that for redundant systems a β-factor should be less than, or equal to 2%. Table 4.2 shows that a
score of 65, according to IEC 62061’s checklist, results in a β-factor of 2%. A score of 65 for both
checklists seem to result in a β-factor of 2%.
As both the checklists are different in their way of questioning and in their way of scoring
the contribution to CFF’s of the different factors, the assimilation of a score of 65 from ISO 13849
checklist, to that of a score of 65 from the IEC 62061, without any motivation or reasoning seems
to be inaccurate and arbitrary.
Table 4.2: Score and β-factor from EN-ISO13849-1 (2006)
Overall score Common cause failure factor
<35 10%
36 to 65 5%
65 to 85 2%
85 to 100 1%
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4.6 Safety integrity level
The concept of SIL is introduced in IEC 61508 and adopted by IEC 62061. A SIL is the level
of integrity a safety function, conducted by a control system, needs to meet to achieve the re-
quired risk reduction. IEC 61508 defines 4 levels. SIL1 is the lowest level of safety integrity and
SIL4 is the highest level. The IEC 62061 has only adopted the SIL 1,2 and 3. Each SIL has spe-
cific requirements that are related to the reliability of the safety function and the structure of
the system that conduct the safety function. These are respectively defined as the quantitative
reliability requirements and the architectural constrains.
Determining the SIL a safety function needs to meet
The IEC 62061 suggests several methods to determine which SIL a safety functions a needs to
meet to gain sufficient risk reduction. It has adopted the SIL assignment matrix in its Annex A,
but refers to the IEC 61508-5 for other methods. Methods presented in the IEC 61508-5 are:
• A quantitative method
• Risk graph methods
• Semi-quantitative method using layer of protection analysis (LOPA)
Quantitative reliability requirements
The IEC 61508 introduces two different reliability measures. The probability of failure on de-
mand (PF D) and the probability of dangerous failure per hour (PF H). The IEC 62061 only
adopts the PF H as a reliability measure and defines it as:
Z probability of dangerous failure per hour "the average probability of a dangerous failure
per hour of a safety-related system/subsystem to perform the specified safety function over a
given period of time." (IEC-62061, 2006)
In which a dangerous failure is defined as:
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Z dangerous failure "failure of a SRECS, a subsystem, or a subsystem element that has the po-
tential to cause a hazard or non-functional state."(IEC-62061, 2006)
The reader known with the IEC 61508 notices that dangerous failures are defined differently
in the IEC 61508. This is related to the fact that the IEC 62061 only considers SRCF’s that operate
in continuous mode or act on high demand. The second part of this report discusses this topic
in further detail.
Architectural constrains
As explained, a SRECS consists at least out of three subsystems. To ensure that the system is
robust enough, IEC 62061 formulates architectural restrains. These constraints specify the re-
dundancy level, of each subsystem, to claim compliance with the SIL’s. Establishing the required
level of redundancy is based on the SIL the subsystem needs to meet, and the safe failure frac-
tion (SFF) of each element within the subsystems. Although originating from IEC 61508, the
architectural constrains presented in IEC 62061 are different. The redundancy level is referred
to as the hardware fault tolerance (HFT). A HFT of N means that N +1 faults in a subsystem can
cause a loss of the SRCF. What HFT is allowed in a subsystem configuration is made depended
on the SFF of each element within the subsystem and the SIL the subsystem needs to meet. Ta-
ble 4.3 shows the the architectural constraints on subsystems. Readers familiar with IEC 61508
might notice that IEC 62061, unlike IEC 61508, does not differentiate between the type and com-
plexity of each element of the SRECS. It also does not allow for a SIL4 to be met by any technical
solution.
As expressed by Rausand (2011), the SFF is a measure of the inherent tendency of an element
to fail towards a safe state. The SFF is calculated as
SFF= The sum of the rate of safe and DD failures of the element
The sum of the rate of safe and dangerous failure of the element
The question is if this way of calculating the SFF still holds in case of continuous demand, as a
dangerous detected or a dangerous undetected failure might have the same effect. The second
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Table 4.3: Architectural constraints on subsystems: maximum SIL that can be claimed
Safe Failure Fraction
Hardware Fault Tolerance
0 1 2
<60% Not allowed SIL 1 SIL 2
60% to <90% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
90% to <99% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3
>99% SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3
part of this report discusses this topic in further detail.
4.7 Comparison and selecting standard to use
Both standards present methods based on dependability studies to design control systems that
comply with the essential health and safety requirements. They both introduce concepts and
methods that establish the risk that needs to be reduced, and give guidance and requirements
on designing systems that shall reduce the risk. Selecting the standard to apply on the control
system is a choice made by the manufacturer. Both the ISO 13849-1 and the IEC 62061 present
table 4.4 in their introduction to show which systems are within the scope of each standard.
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Table 4.4: Recommended application ofIEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 from EN-ISO13849-1 (2006)
The technical report IEC/TR 62061-1: "Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and IEC
62061 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery" describes the following ex-
amples of selection criteria:
• previous knowledge and experience in the design of machinery safety-related systems
based upon one of the standards;
• safety-related control systems based upon media other than electrical can mean that the
use of ISO 13849-1 is more appropriate;
• customer requirements to demonstrate the safety integrity of a machine safety-related
control system in terms of a SIL can mean that the use of IEC 62061 is more appropriate;
• safety-related control systems of machinery used in, for example, the process industries,
where other safety-related systems are characterized in terms of SILs, can mean that the
use of IEC 62061 is more appropriate.
It is recommended to select the standard based on the scope description of both standards.
If the system that is to be designed fits both standards, the practical selection criteria such as
presented in IEC/TR 62061-1 can be decisive.
Part II
Continuous Mode
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Chapter 5
Continuous mode
The first part of this report has shown how the machinery directive is structured and how the
harmonised standards on functional safety introduce concepts for systematic risk reduction by
the use of control systems in machinery. It has become apparent that the phenomenon of safety-
related control functions that operate in continuous mode (SRCFcont.) are underexposed. This
leads to some points of interest for engineers that are familiar with methods and concepts pre-
sented in the IEC 61508. The introduction of a process control function, conducted by the basic
control system of machinery, that can be regarded as safety critical and can be defined as such
has implications for defining integrity requirements for the control function and the overall de-
sign of control systems. The duality in function, being a process and safety function, means that
the demand rate of the safety function and the process control function is equal. When the de-
mand for the process control function is continuous, the demand rate for the safety function is
continuous as well. Within the IEC 61508 framework the continuous mode is defined as follows
Z Continues mode "where the safety function retains the equipment under control (EUC) in a
safe state as part of normal operation." (IEC-61508, 2010)
The IEC 62061 adds to this definition the note that continuous mode means that a safety-
related control function is performed perpetually, i.e. the SRECS is continuously controlling the
machine and a failure of its function results in a hazardous event. This implies that there is a
direct causal relation between the failure of the SRCFcont. and the probability of a hazardous
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event occurring. This makes that there is a significant difference between the SRCFcont. and the
safety functions that act on a demand such as discussed in the IEC 61508
Protection layers and the ISO 12100:2010 framework
Chapter 3 explains that the ISO 12100:2010 promotes a specific order of protection layers to re-
duce the machine risk to an acceptable level. During design of the machinery, risk reduction by
inherently safe design measures has precedence over all other measures. The basic control sys-
tem design is seen as an inherently safe design measure. The IEC 62061 introduced the SRECS
that may conduct a SRCFcont. as part of the basic control system. These SRCF will have to meet
the integrity requirements and the architectural constrains stated in the standard. Once it is not
practicable to reduce risk by use of these SRCFs, a Safety-instrumented system (SIS) might be
designed. A SIS is then seen as a safeguarding and complementary protective measure. These
SISs only act upon the failure of preceding safety layers, such as the SRCF. Therefore they act on
demand. When the demand occurs, the SIS brings the machinery, referred to as the equipment
under control (EUC), into a safe state. A safety function conducted by a SIS that is assigned a
SIL is called a safety instrumented function (SIF). The design choice of adding a SIS to the ma-
chine does not mean that the SRCF no longer needs to meet the requirements set in the IEC
62061. Adding safety layers such as a SIS is a proven concept of reducing risk related to the EUC.
This concept is often referred to as the onion model and is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Each layer
reduced the risk concerning the EUC. It illustrates the sequences of protection layers. The se-
quence starts from the center and proceeds outwards. Safety layers that act on demands, failure
of previous safety layer, can be interpreted as a safety barrier that by conducting its function,
prevents a hazardous event of happening. As Rausand (2014) explains: "The interpretation of
hazardous event related to a safety function operating in demanded mode is illustrated in Figure
5.1 where two safety barriers that perform safety functions are installed against a certain type of
demands."
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Figure 5.1: The interpretation of a hazardous
event to a safety function operated in de-
manded mode. From Rausand (2014)
Figure 5.2: The onion model from Rausand et al.
(2010)
Issues
This chapter will explore points of interest for designers of control systems that conduct SRCFcont.
The following issues will be discussed:
1. Design of a SRCFcont. and establish its safety integrity, and
2. the combination of a SRECS that conducts a SRCF in continuous mode and a SIS that
conducts a SIF on demand to achieve sufficient risk reduction.
5.1 PFH of SRCFcont.
The reliability measure used in the IEC 62061 for SRCF that need to meet a certain SIL is ex-
pressed in PFH. PFH is defined as the probability of a dangerous failure per hour of a safety-
related system/subsystem to perform the specified safety function over a given period of time.
To calculate the PFH we therefore need to know the two factors:
1. The probability of dangerous failures, and
2. the period of time.
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Dangerous failures
In case of a safety function that acts on demand, a dangerous failure is a safety function failure
that can lead to a hazardous event in the machine that is protected by the safety function, if
a demand for the safety function should occur. As the demand for the function is not always
present, a dangerous failure within the safety function can occur and only show when the de-
mand presents itself. This type of failure is called dangerous undetected failure (DU). A failure
that can be observed before the function is demanded, is called a dangerous detected failure
(DD).
With the introduction of the SRECS that may conduct a SRCFcont. as part of the basic control
system, this definition of a dangerous failure does not hold. In case of continues mode, the
demand for the SRCF can be interpreted as equal to one. It is always present. Any failure of the
SRCF, at any time during operation, leads to a hazardous event. Therefore, a dangerous failure
is a failure that terminates the ability of the SRECS to conduct its SRCF.
If we assume that a hazardous event occurs more or less immediately when a dangerous
failure occurs, the distinction between a dangerous detected (DD) and a dangerous undetected
(DU) failure is of no meaning.
Period of time
When calculating the PFH and the item is neither proof-tested, nor overhauled, the IEC 61508
states that a life time of twenty years should be used in the calculation of the PFH. This period
of time is denoted as τ
Equations
As explained in section 4.3 of part one, control systems that conducts a safety function, consist
out of at least three subsystems. These are:
1. Sensor subsystem (S).
2. Logic solver subsystem (LG).
3. Final element subsystems (FE).
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The three subsystems are configured as a series system. It is assumed that the three subsystems
are independent and have high reliability. The probability that two or three subsystems fail at
the same time is negligible, such that the PF H system can be expressed as:
PF H system = PF H S+PF H LG+PF H FE (5.1)
For each subsystem the PFH is:
PF H G(0,τ)= Mean number of dangerous group failures in (0,τ)
τ
(5.2)
The average PFH over the test interval is also the long term average and is given by:
PF H G(0,τ)= 1
τ
∫ τ
0
PF H G (t )d t (5.3)
In this chapter examples of safety systems are introduced and used for demonstrating how
the reliability can be calculated. In these examples, calculations are done by the Markov method.
For an introduction into using the Markov to calculate the PFH see Rausand (2014) and Rausand
and Høyland (2004). As the Markov method is used, 5.3 can be expressed as:
PF H G(0,τ)= 1
τ
∑
i∈Mc
Λi
∫ τ
0
P i(t ) (5.4)
PF H G(0,τ)=
∑
i∈Mc
ΛiP i[0,τ] (5.5)
Where M c denotes the set of critical working states,Λi the sum of the failure rates removing the
critical working state i and finishing in the failed state. P i[0,τ] denotes the average probability
of being in the critical working state, per unit of time.
5.2 Architectural constraints in continuous mode
Architectural constraints are introduced in Part one, chapter 4 of this report. It describes that the
IEC 62061 adopts a slightly modified HFT method from the IEC 61508. The required redundancy
in the subsystems is established by the SFF of components and the SIL that needs to be met
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by the SRCF. Authors such as Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) discuss if the use of HFT is an
appropriate method to introduce robustness into the system. Still, as the standards adopt the
HFT requirement it is of interest to discuss the topic and assess if the introduction of continuous
mode has influence on the structural requirements for SRECS’s.
The SIL a SRCF needs to perform is independent of its operation mode. Continuous, high
or low demand, the SIL is set during the risk assessment with knowledge of the mode of oper-
ation. The SFF on the other hand might be different in continuous mode or demand mode. As
expressed by Rausand (2011), the SFF is a measure of the inherent tendency of an element to fail
towards a safe state. The SFF is calculated as
SFF= The sum of the rate of safe and DD failures of the element
The sum of the rate of safe and dangerous failure of the element
(5.6)
Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) interprets this as:
SF F = P (The failure is "safe" |A component failure occurs) (5.7)
The reason the safe and DD failures are summed in (5.6) is because it is assumed that when the
DD occurs a repair action can be conducted before the component is to conduct its function. In
case of continuous mode this reasoning does not longer hold. This would mean that in case of
continuous mode:
SFF= The rate of safe failures of the element
The sum of the rate of safe and dangerous failure of the element
(5.8)
This has enormous effect on how a system should be structured if the architectural constraints
are to met. This is shown in example 5.1
Example 5.1 For this example we take the data for a generic pressure transmitter pre-
sented in Annex Data. If we assume that the functions act in demand mode, the SSF is
calculated with the Equation (5.6), this gives:
SFF= The sum of the rate of safe and DD failures of the element
The sum of the rate of safe and dangerous failure of the element
(5.9)
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SFF= λS+λDD
λS+λD
(5.10)
SFF= 5E −7+5E −7
5E −7+8E −7 (5.11)
SFF= 77% (5.12)
Using Table 4.3 we establish that if we want to meet the requirements for SIL2, the HFT
should be 1. Meaning that a subsystem consisting out of this transmitter can be structured
as 1oo2. In case of a safety function that operates in continuous mode, we use (5.8). This
gives:
SFF= The rate of safe failures of the element
The sum of the rate of safe and dangerous failure of the element
(5.13)
SFF= λS
λS+λD
(5.14)
SFF= 5E −7
5E −7+8E −7 (5.15)
SFF= 38% (5.16)
Using Table 4.3 we establish that if we want to meet the requirements for SIL2, the HFT
should be 2. Meaning that a subsystem consisting out of this transmitter can be structured
as 1oo3
This would lead to a bigger amount of redundancy that might lead to a less safe system, as
discussed by Lundteigen and Rausand (2009)
5.3 The SRCF is the ultimate barrier
If we assume that the SRCF is the ultimate safety barrier before assets are harmed, repairing
the barrier is not an option. Simply because no other measure will bring the machinery into a
safe state, when the SRCF fails. In this case the PF H should be calculated from its unreliability
F (T ) = 1−R(t ). As discussed there is no need to split the dangerous failure rate into DD and
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DU. System one is used to show how structuring a SRCF and calculating the PFH of the system
is done.
System one A SCRF that operates in continuous mode, is conducted by a SRCS that con-
sists out of three subsystems. It is an ultimate barrier. The first subsystem consists out of
sensors that measure pressure, the second subsystem consist out of a logic solver and the
third subsystem consists out of solenoid valves. With the data presented in the Appendix
’Data’, the structure of the function is designed to meet SIL2. Note that due to operation in
continuous mode, and the system being an ultimate barrier, the SFF excluding the DD as
safe is used to establish the HFT.
• The sensor has a SFF of 38%. The required HFT = 2. The subsystem is voted 1oo3.
• The standard industrial PLC has a SFF of 50%. The required HFT = 2. The subsystem
is voted 1oo3.
• The solenoid valve has a SFF of 63%. The required HFT = 1. The subsystem is voted
1oo2.
The system is shown as a Reliability Block diagram in Figure 5.3
Figure 5.3: RBD system one
5.3.1 Markov modelling
The markov models for each subsystem of System one are shown in the Appendix ’Calcula-
tions". As we assume the complete SRCS is an ultimate barrier, the models do not include repair
rates, nor does it distinguish between DD’s and DU’s. With the results shown in Tables C.1, C.2
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and C.4 of Appendix ’Calculations and results’ the PF H system =
PF H system = PF H S+PF H LG+PF H FE (5.17)
PF H system = 6.35E −08+1.31E −06+3.65E −07 (5.18)
PF H system = 1.7E −06 (5.19)
Although system one meets the architectural requirements, the required PFH for a SIL2 is not
met. See Table 5.1
Table 5.1: SIL for high demand and continuous safety functions
SIL PFH
SIL 4 10−9 to 10−8
SIL 3 10−8 to 10−7
SIL 2 10−7 to 10−6
SIL 1 10−6 to 10−5
5.4 The SRCF is not the ultimate barrier
If we assume that the SRCF is not the ultimate safety barrier, repair of the safety barrier might be
possible as the second barrier will bring the machinery into a safe state with a certain probabil-
ity. In this case the PF H should be calculated from its unavailability U (t ). For that same reason,
the architectural requirements can be met by using the SFF that includes the DD as safe. This is
done for system two.
System two A barrier sequence consists out of SRCFcont. that is followed by a SIF that acts
on demand. The SRCFcont. is conducted by a SRCS that consists out of three subsystems. The
first subsystem consists out of sensors that measure pressure, the second subsystem consist
out of a logic solver and the third subsystem consists out of solenoid valves. With the data
presented in the Appendix ’Data’, the structure of the function is designed to meet SIL2. Note
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that due to the fact the SRCFcont. is not the ultimate safety barrier, the SFF that includes the
DD as safe, is used to establish the HFT.
• The sensor has a SFF of 77%. The required HFT = 1. The subsystem is voted 1oo2.
• The standard industrial PLC has a SFF of 80%. The required HFT = 1. The subsystem
is voted 1oo2.
• The solenoid valve has a SFF of 73%. The required HFT = 1. The subsystem is voted
1oo2.
The system is shown as a Reliability Block diagram in Figure 5.4
Figure 5.4: RBD system one
Some contemplation
The statement that the repair of the safety barrier might be possible as the second barrier will
bring the machinery into a safe state with a certain probability and that for this reason the PF H
should be calculated from its unavailability U (t ), introduces some food for thought. This state-
ment introduced a certain ’operational’ dependency within the barriers. The repair action can
only be conducted when the second barrier puts the system into a safe state. As this is not
a certain outcome, but a probability, the repair actions can only be conducted with a certain
probability. This is expressed in Equation (5.20)
P (repairing the first barrier when it has failed)=
P (the second barrier does not fail | the first barrier has failed.) (5.20)
A Markov of the sensor subsystem of system two is shown in Figure 5.5. The markov shows
that reaching the safe state (state 6), that allows repair of the system (µRepair system), is dependent
on the success rate (λSuccess 2nd) of the succeeding barrier. Although the model visualises the
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dependency between reaching the safe state and the the possibility of a repair action, the model
cannot be used to calculated the PFH. This is due to the fact the process does not qualify as a
Markov process. As Rausand and Høyland (2004) explains, a process qualifies as a Markov pro-
cess if the amount of time it spends in each state, before going to the next state, is exponentially
distributed. There is no reason to assume that λSuccess 2nd is exponential distributed.
It is clear that configurations such as system two introduce challenges in modelling the re-
liability of such systems. The ’operational’ dependency within the barriers does not only intro-
duce challenges in modelling, it also conflicts with the design method promoted in the ISO12100
framework. The next paragraph will elaborate on this.
0
3
1
2 5
4 6
βDD
2(1−βDD)λDD
2(1−βDU)λDU
βDU
λDDλDU
µDD
λDD
λDU
λSuccess 2nd
λSuccess 2nd
λSuccess 2nd
µRepair system
Figure 5.5: Markov model of subsystem of system two
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Table 5.2: States of system
presented in Figure 5.5
State Description
0 All OK
1 One DD, One OK
2 One DU, One OK
3 All DD
4 One DD, One DU
5 All DU
6 Safe state
Table 5.3: Transitions of system presented in
Figure 5.5
Transition Description
λDD Failure rate DD
λDU Failure rate DU
βDD CCF DD
βDU CCF DU
λSuccess 2nd Success rate of succeeding barrier
µRepair system Repair rate of barrier.
5.5 Combining a SRCF and a SIF
Designing a safety barrier sequence, consisting out of a SRCFcont. and a safety function that acts
on the failure of the SRCF, introduces the following dependencies in the design:
• The structure of a SRECS that conducts a SRCFcont. is dependent on the presence of a
succeeding barrier. This is due to the fact that the SFF of components can be calculated
differently for when they are placed within an ultimate barriers that operates in continu-
ous mode, than for when they are placed within a non-ultimate barrier that operates in
continuous mode.
• The PFH, as defined in the applicable standard, of a SRCFcont. is dependent on the pres-
ence of a succeeding barriers. If it is assumed that a succeeding barrier might put the ma-
chinery under control into a safe state, repairing actions of the SRECS can be conducted,
if the succeeding barriers function.
The concept of adding safety layers to machinery, as done in the ISO12100 framework, to reduce
risk to an acceptable level, might seem as a straight forward concept. But with the dependencies
described, the incremental design of safe control systems introduces problems in the design
process.This will be made clear by means of example 5.2.
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Example 5.2 Let us assume we have a certain basic control system, a SRECS, that con-
ducts a SRCFcont.. If this SRCFcont. fails a hazardous event occurs. Throughout the design
process, conform the IEC 62061, it is assessed that the SRECS should perform at SIL 3. After
implementation and verification of the SRCFcont., it shows that the the SRCFcont. performs
at SIL2. We call this calculation one. It is not deemed practical to introduce more SRCFs
to reduce the risk of the same hazard. The designer opts for risk reduction by adding a SIF
conducted by a SIS. We call this decision one. Assessing the risk reduction the SIF needs
to perform is done through conducting a LOPA. The LOPA is conducted with the following
assumptions:
• The tolerated probability of the hazardous event occurring is within SIL3
• The hazardous event occurs due to failure of the control system. Before decision one
was made, it was known that the SRCFcont. performs at SIL2. Therefore the initial like-
lihood of the hazardous event occurring is assumed to be equal to the highest bound
of SIL2.
• The only barriers in place are ’General design’ and the ’Control system’. As failure of
each causes the hazardous event, they do not contribute to the risk reduction for the
considered hazardous event.
With these assumptions the SIL of the SIF is determined.
Determining the SIL of the new SIF as described in example 5.1 is conform the ISO 12100
framework, but may lead to an inaccurate assessment of the safety integrity of the full barrier
sequence. This has two reasons:
1. When calculation one is conducted, the SRCFcont. is the ultimate barrier. After making
decision one, introducing a second barrier, the SRCFcont. becomes a non-ultimate bar-
rier. Meaning, that at the time of calculation one, the PF H is calculated from SRCFcont.’s
unreliability. Once the second barrier is introduced, the PF H of the SRCFcont. may be
calculated from its unavailability. This is due to the fact repair of the SRCFcont. is made
possible.
CHAPTER 5. CONTINUOUSMODE 52
2. After decisions one, it is possible to change the structure of the of the SRECS that conducts
the SRCFcont.. This is due to the face that the SFF of the operating components might be
calculated differently. This would result into a different system configuration and there-
fore a different PF H .
This makes that the incremental adding of barriers, as done in the ISO12100 framework, does
not fit safety barrier sequences that consist out of at least one SRCFcont.. A fitting approach to
this design issue is proposed in Chapter 6 of this report.
5.6 Relation between HEF and SIL
To understand the relation between the SIL requirements for SRCFcont. and SIL requirements for
a safety function that acts on demand, it is of interest to establish the relation between SIL and
the Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF ). Figure 5.1 shows that a hazardous event can occur when
a demand for a safety function is present and a safety function (safety barrier) fails. Rausand
et al. (2010) explains that for a safety function operated in demand mode, a hazardous event
can occur in two different ways:
1. A demand occurs while the SRCF/SIF has a dangerous fault.
2. A dangerous failure of the the SRECS/SIS occurs while a demand situation is present
When the SRCF/SIF functions in continuous mode, a hazardous event occurs more or less im-
mediately when a dangerous failure of the SRCF/SIF occurs. The consequence of the hazardous
event depends on:
1. Whether the SRCF/SIF is the ultimate safety barrier before assets are harmed, or there are
other safety barriers that may prevent or mitigate the consequences.
2. Whether or not failures can be detected fast enough to allow the EUC to be brought into a
safe state before assets are harmed.
From this, Rausand et al. (2010) deduces that the HEF in case of a safety barrier acts on demand
can be given as:
HEF = PF Davg∗λdemand (5.21)
CHAPTER 5. CONTINUOUSMODE 53
In which the PF Davg is the average probability of dangerous failure on demand and λdemand
represents the demand rate for the safety function.
Assuming a safety function operates in continuous mode and is the ultimate barrier, a haz-
ardous event occurs more or less immediately when the safety function fails. Therefore it is fair
to assume that:
HEF ≈ PF H (5.22)
Both the IEC 61508 and the IEC 62061 give the SIL reliability requirements for safety functions
that operate in high demand and continuous mode in probability of dangerous failure per hour
(PF H). See Table 5.4. For safety functions that act on demands with a lower frequency than once
a year, the IEC 61508 gives the SIL reliability requirements in probability of failure on demand
(PF Davg). See Table 5.5
Table 5.4: SIL for high
demand and continuous
safety functions
SIL PFH
SIL 4 10−9 to 10−8
SIL 3 10−8 to 10−7
SIL 2 10−7 to 10−6
SIL 1 10−6 to 10−5
Table 5.5: SIL for low demand safety functions
SIL PFD
SIL 4 10−5 to 10−4
SIL 3 10−4 to 10−3
SIL 2 10−3 to 10−2
SIL 1 10−2 to 10−1
Equations (5.21) and (5.22) make clear there is a fundamental difference between a SIL ex-
pressed in PFD, and a SIL expressed in PFH. In case of a SIL for demand mode, the SIL can be
interpreted as measure of risk reduction. Whilst, in case of the continuous mode, the SIL can be
interpreted as a normative requirement for the maximum allowed HEF.
The HEF after a barrier sequence that consist out of a SRCFcont. and safety barrier that acts
on the failure of the SRCFcont. is implemented (HEFBarrier sequence), can be expressed as:
HEF Barrier sequence = PF H SRCFcont. ∗PF Dsecond barrier (5.23)
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In which the failure of the SRCFcont. is a demand for the second barrier. The second barrier fails
with a PFDsecond barrier. This results in a hazardous event.
As previously discussed, the PFH of the SRCFcont. is not independent of the PFDsecond barrier.
The SIL approach might therefore not be the most fitting approach when designing a barrier
sequence consisting out of at least one SRCFcont. and succeeding safety barrier.
5.7 Design problems
Designing a barrier sequence consisting out of a SRCFcont.and SIF’s which act on demand, is not
as straight forward as it seems. Combining the two safety barriers to achieve the appropriate
risk reduction, will lead to problems in the systematic design process as promoted in the ISO
12100 framework. Chapter 6 shows that these problems are caused by the following reasons:
1. There are dependencies when designing safety barrier sequences that consist out of more
than one safety barrier of which the first one is a SRCFcont.. Calculating the PFH of a
SRCFcont. that is an ultimate barrier is done differently than calculating the PFH of a SRCFcont.
that is a non-ultimate barrier. Once the designer makes the decision to introduce a second
safety barrier, its prior reliability calculations are no longer valid, and shouldn’t be used to
establish the performance requirements of the succeeding barrier.
2. SIL for functions that operate in continuous mode has a different relation with the HEF
than a SIL for functions that act on demand. This makes that the SIL approach, presented
in the IEC standards, might not be the most suitable method to establish overall achieved
risk reduction of the control system at hand.
Chapter 6
Design solution
Once it is known that the SRCFcont. does not reduce the risk to an acceptable level, and it is
decided that a second barrier needs to be introduced, engineers will encounter problems that
are described in Chapter five.
Instead of the incremental adding of barriers, such as promoted in the ISO 12100 frame-
work, chapter six proposes and integral approach. It explores a solution that assesses the reli-
ability of the full barrier sequence in situations that the sequences consists out of at least one
SRCFcont.. Thus, overcoming the problems with the SIL concept and the modelling of opera-
tional dependency. Resulting in a more accurate assessment of the safety integrity of the full
barrier sequence.
6.1 HEF instead of SIL
Due to the fact that a SIL for a SRCFcont. and a SIL for a SIF that acts on demand have a different
meaning, it proposed to abandon the SIL concept for now. Instead of first establishing the SIL of
a designed SRCFcont. and use this outcome to set the SIL for the SIF, it is proposed to establish the
frequency of a certain hazard (HEF) after the full barrier sequence (SRCFcont. and SIFdemand.) is
introduced. It then can be evaluated if the HEF after the implementation of the barrier sequence
meets the acceptable HEF. This approach will make it possible to:
• model the full barrier sequence. This allows for the modelling of the non-technical, but
operational dependencies. Such as the introduction of repair actions of the SRCFcont. once
55
CHAPTER 6. DESIGN SOLUTION 56
the succeeding barrier (SIFdemand.) has put the machine into a safe state.
• optimize the availability of the barrier sequence with respect to the test interval of the
SIFdemand..
6.2 modelling the barrier sequence
As discussed and shown in the previous chapter, modelling the reliability of systems consisting
out a SRCFcont. and a SIFdemand can not be done by the Markov approach. This is due the depen-
dencies between the possibility of conducting repair actions and the machinery being in a safe
state after failure of the SRCFcont.. A more fitting method of modelling these kinds of systems is
the use of Petri-nets. Petri-nets are discussed in the IEC 61508 and author such as Seatzu et al.
(2013) give a detail description of their use and possibilities.
To explore how Petri-nets can be used to establish the HEF of a full barrier sequence, we
again look at system two that is introduced in chapter five. The system configuration is shown
in Figure 6.1. The petri-net method lets us split this system into parts. These are:
Figure 6.1: System two and full barrier sequence
1. A petri-net of the channels of the voted groups of the SRCFcont.
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2. A petri-net of the voted group of the SRCFcont.
3. A petri-net of the SRCFcont.
4. A petri-net of the SIFdemand
5. A petri-net of the interaction between the SRCFcont. and the SIFdemand
Petri-net of Channels of 1oo2 group
Figure 6.2 shows a Petri-net of a group voted 1oo2. The legend is shown in Table 6.1 and 6.2. The
group consists out of two channels. System two consists out of three groups that are voted 1oo2.
When modelling this system, the following assumptions are made:
• Each channel can have a DD or a DU failure, but never at the same time. If a channel has
a DD, it cannot have a DU until the DD is repaired. If a channel has a DU, it cannot have a
DD until the DD is repaired.
• When a DD is detected, repair of the channel is conducted
• A DU can only be repaired when the machine is put into a safe state after the SRCF has
failed.
For a full description of all transitions and firing of tokens see Appendix ’Petri-nets’. For now
it is sufficient to describe when a channel is in a failed state and the conditions for repair. A
channel (a token in P.Chi.f ) is failed when:
• there is a token in P.DD.f, or
• there is a token in P.DU.f.
A channel can be repaired when:
• there is a token in P.Chi, due to t.DD.chi. Repair of the DD (firing of t.r.DD.chi) is made
possible when a token leaves P.DD.f. A token will leave P.DD.f. with the rate of µDD .
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• there is a token in P.Chi, due to t.DU.chi. Repair of the DU (firing of t.r.DU.chi) is made
possible when a token leaves P.DU.f. A token will leave P.DU.f when there is a token at
P.SS.f.SRCF. If there is a token at P.DU.f and P.SS.f.SRCF, a token will leave P.DU.f with a rate
of µDU .
Figure 6.2: Petri-net of channels one and two from 1oo2 Groupi, system two
Petri-net of 1oo2 voted group
Knowing the conditions for a failed channel (a token at place P.Chi) makes it possible the con-
struct a simple petri-net of voted groupi failing. This is shown in Figure 6.3. The legend is shown
in Table 6.1 and 6.2. When both P.Ch1.Gi.f and P.Ch2.Gi.f have a token, t.Gi.f will be fired. P.Gi.f.
will receive a token. Result, Gi has failed.
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Table 6.1: Description of Places of the petri-net shown in Figure 6.2
Place Description
P.DD.w Channel is functioning with respect to the DD.
P.DD.f Channel has failed with respect to the DD.
P.DU.w Channel is functioning with respect to the DU.
P.DU.f Channel has failed with respect to the DU.
P.Chi.w Channeli is functioning
P.Chi.f Channeli has failed
P.SS.f.SRCF Machine is in safe state after failure SRCF
P.Ch1.Gi.f Channel1 of the 1oo2 voted groupi has failed
P.Ch2.Gi.f Channel2 of the 1oo2 voted groupi has failed
P.Gi.f Voted groupi has failed
Table 6.2: Description of Transitions of the petri-net shown in Figure 6.2
Transitions Description
λDD A DD failure
λDU A DU failure
µDD Repair rate DD
µDU Repair rate DU
t.DD.chi Chi has a DD failure
t.DU.chi Chi has a DU failure
t.r.DD.chi Repair action of DD failure for Chi
t.r.DU.chi Repair action of DU failure for Chi
t.Gi.f Voted groupi failure
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Figure 6.3: Petri-net of a 1oo2 voted group, with results from Figure 6.2
Petri-net of SRCF
As the SRCFcont. we are discussing consists out of the 1oo2 voted subsystems Gsensors, GLogic and
GFinal elements, the petri-net of the full SRCFcont. can be modeled as shown in Figure 6.4. Legend
is given in Table 6.3.
Figure 6.4: Petri-net of a 1oo2 voted group, with results from Figure 6.2
The SRCFcont. is considert to be failed if one of the three voted groups is in a failed state.
Meaning that P.SRCFContinuous will receive a token if P.GSensor.f, P.GLogic.f or P.GFinal elements.f has
a token.
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Table 6.3: Description of places and transitions of the petri-net shown in Figure 6.4
Place / Transitions Description
P.GSensor.f Voted groupsensor has failed
P.GLogic.f Voted grouplogic has failed
P.GFinal elements.f Voted groupFinal elements has failed
P.SRCFContinuous.f SRCFContinuous has failed
P.SIF.w SIF is working
P.SIF.f SIF has failed
t.GSensor.f Failure of groupsensor
t.GLogic.f Failure of groupLogic
t.GFinal Elements.f Failure of groupFinal elements
t.SIF.f Failure of SIF
t.SIF.r Repair of SIF
Petri-net of SIF
As the report does not describe a SIF that acts on demand we model a simplified petri-net of the
SIF. Only consisting out of a place with the attribute that the SIF is functioning, a place with the
attribute that the SIF fails, the failure transition, and a repair transition. This model is shown in
Figure 6.5. Legend is given in Table 6.3
Figure 6.5: Petri-net of SIF
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Petri-net of interaction between SRCF and SIF
All the sub systems of the full barrier series are modeled. It is now possible to construct a petri-
net of their interaction. This petri net is shown if Figure 6.6. The legend is given in Table ?? A
hazard occurs once the SRCF has failed and the SIF has failed. In the petri-net the failure of the
SRCF is modeled with place P.SRCF.f leading to a demand. If the SIF is functioning at the time
of demand, there is no token in place P.Hz.event. Meaning, the machine is put into a safe state
after failure of the SRCF (place P.SS). This allows for repair of the SRCF. The system is than reset
and the SRCF that is also a production function continues operation.
Figure 6.6: Petri-net of interaction between SRCF and SIF
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6.3 Simulation
For readability the petri-nets described in paragraph 6.2 are simplified versions of the full model
that is used for simulation. Appendix ’Petri-Net’ presents a more complex model that is con-
structed in the modelling program GRIF-petri. The model shows the complete interaction be-
tween the separate-petri nets and introduces reset functions that are necessary to conduct re-
pair actions once a 1oo2 voted group has failed.
As stated, the petri-net that describes the SIFdemand is limited. In the GRIF model, the PFD
of the SIFdemand is simulated with a Monte Carlo simulation. At the moment the model does not
include CCF and has not been peer reviewed. The model is therefore not yet completed nor is it
validated. Nevertheless, the model shows some interesting and plausible results that are worth
discussing.
6.3.1 HEF, PFH and PFD
As explained, it is proposed to not use the SIL concept. As SIL for demand and SIL for continuous
mode mean two different things, it decided to model the HEF. A hazardous event occurs when
the SRCF fails and the SIF fails. In the full Petri-net model this situation occurs when a token
reaches the place P.HEF. In this case, the HEF can be found by:
HEF = The amount of tokens P.HEF has received [0, τ]
τ
(6.1)
The PFH of the SRCFcont. is equal to the average demand frequency of the SIFdemand. In the
model this is represented by the average amount of transitions between the SRCFcont. and the
SIFdemand. In the model this is transition tr.299. The PFH of the SRCFcont. can be found by:
PF H SRCFcont. =
The amount of firing tr.299 over [0,τ]
τ
(6.2)
A simulations is conducted. Data used, the GRIFpetri model and full outcome of the simu-
lation is presented in Appendix ’Petri-nets’. The HEF from the simulation of system two:
HEF = 3.804E −2
175200
= 2.17E −7 (6.3)
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The PFH of the SRCFcont. from the simulation:
PF H = 0.7621
175200
= 4.35E −6 (6.4)
With a PFD of the SIFdemand set on 5E−2 it is possible to control if the model, models the relation
between the SRCFcont. correctly. This can be done by applying Equation (5.23). This gives:
HEF overall = PF H SRCF∗PF DSIF (6.5)
HEF overall = 4.35E −6∗5E −2= 2.17E −7 (6.6)
As the outcome of Equation (6.6) and the outcome of the petri-net simulation (Equation (6.3))
are the same, it can be assumed that the model, models the relation between the SRCFcont. and
the SIFdemand correctly. This can be verified with varying values of the parameters and check if
the outcome will show the same.
6.4 Optimizing availability with respect to the SIF test interval
The introduction of this chapter states that is possible to optimize the availability of the full
barrier sequence with respect to the SIF test interval. The petri-net model shown in this report
is not yet completed and optimizing is not yet possible. Once the petri-net of the SIFdemand. is
constructed and added, it is possible to vary the test interval during the simulations and find the
lowest HEF. This can be researched further at a later moment.
Chapter 7
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
This project had two phases. The first phase was of an exploring nature and had as main ob-
jectives to (1) give an introduction to the machinery directive, its structure, and main safety
requirements with special focus on requirements regarding safety-related control systems, to
(2) give an introduction to functional safety, to (3) present the two competing standards IEC
62061 and ISO 13849, highlighting their similarities and differences, and to (4) present current
issues within the design of reliable and safe control system for machinery. The second phase
focused on current issues within the design of reliable and safe control systems for machinery.
It had as main objectives to (1) give an in-depth analysis of the issue regarding safety-functions
that operate in continuous mode and to (2) present concepts and solutions that might be used
to resolve the issues regarding safety-functions that operate in continuous mode. The results
of the first phase of the project are presented in the first part of the report. The results of the
second phase are presented and discussed in the second part of this report.
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Part one
The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC is European legislation that promotes free movement of
machinery within the EU and guarantees a high level of protection of the EU workers and citi-
zens. The introduction clarifies that compliance with the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC is of
major influence on the design of machinery. The importance of functional safety and the grow-
ing role of control systems in reducing risk are discussed. Relevant standards are mentioned
and public sources of European legislation are listed.
A comprehensive literature study into the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC, the require-
ments and the compliance process is presented in chapter two. It describes the scope of the
directive, a detailed description of the process of compliance and the technical files manufac-
turers should produce and update. The process of compliance is visualised by a flowchart, pre-
sented in Figure 2.4.
Chapter three introduces the harmonised standards and explains the difference between the
A,B and C standards. It is stated that at the core of achieving safety of machinery, lies a risk based
approach. The main concept of this approach is described in the A-standard ISO 12100:2010;
’Safety of machinery - General principles for design - Risk assessment and risk reduction’. The
chapter explains how this standard introduces systematic risk reduction and that the ISO 12100
promotes a hierarchal implementation of (1) inherently safe design measures, (2) safeguarding
and complementary protective measures and (3) information for use. A flowchart of the risk
assessment process from the ISO 12100 is presented in Figure 3.1. It is concluded that from
the ISO 12100 it is clear that safety functions, conducted by control systems, are part of the
inherently safe design of machinery.
Chapter four continues with listing the requirements from the Machinery Directive 2006/42/
EC for control systems. Standards ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 are introduced and a short history
of both standards is given. The concept of functional safety is explained. Section 4.3 describes
how control systems and safety-related functions are categorized in the different standards. It is
concluded that it is not clear whether both standards’ definitions of safety-related control sys-
tems and functions, have the same meaning. The terms Safety-related part of a control system
(SRP/CS), Safety-Related Electrical Control Systems (SRECS) and Safety-related control func-
tions (SRCF) are introduced and explained.
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Next, the chapter describes shortly how from the categorization of functions and systems,
the concept of continuous mode is derived. A safety function operates in a continuous mode
when the safety function retains the machine in a safe state as part of normal operation. The
fact a control function can be regarded as safety critical and might be defined as such, has im-
plications for defining integrity requirements for the control function. These implications are
discussed in part two of the report.
A short contemplation on risk estimation, the meaning of tolerable risk and required risk
reduction is given in section 4.4. This section introduces the concepts of performance levels(PL)
and safety integrity levels(SIL). Both concepts, respectively originating from ISO 3849-1 and IEC
61508/62061, are discussed. Points of interest are highlighted by use of examples. It is concluded
that, although the standards might show guidance, the designer of the control system needs to
asses their applicability on the system at hand.
Chapter four ends with a short comparison of the standards ISO 3849-1 and IEC 62061. It
lists possible criteria a manufacturer can base his decision on for selecting which standard to
use. It is recommended to select the standard based on the scope of the standards. If the system
that is to be designed fits both standards, practical selection criteria can be decisive.
Part two
Part two of this report elaborates on the issue of continuous mode that is highlighted in chapter
four. Chapter five starts with the conclusion that the phenomenon of safety- related control
functions that operate in continuous mode (SRCFcont.) is underexposed in the standards and
the literature. The following issues are discussed in the chapter; (1) design of a SRCFcont. and
establishing its safety integrity, and (2) combining a SRCFcont. and a SIS that conducts a SIF on
demand to achieve sufficient risk reduction.
The reliability measure used in IEC 62061 for SRCFcont. that needs to meet a certain SIL is
expressed in PFH. IEC 62061 defines PFH as "the probability of a dangerous failure per hour
of a safety-related system/subsystem to perform the specified safety function over a given period
of time." With the introduction of the SRECS that conducts a SRCFcont., meaning the SRECS is
a basic control system, a dangerous failure is a failure that terminates the ability of the control
system to conduct its SRCFcont.. This definition of a dangerous failure is fundamentally different
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than dangerous failure of safety functions that act on demand. Chapter five explains how and
why this has a major influence on how a system is structured and how the PFH of such a system
can be calculated. Section 5.2 explains that due to the definition of dangerous failure, the SFF
of components is to be calculated differently than usual. Example 5.1 shows that this results
in a higher measure of required redundancy to meet the architectural constraints. The chapter
continues with demonstrates how the reliability of a SRCFcont. can be calculated with the Markov
method.
Next, chapter five discusses how to establish the reliability of a SRCFcont. that is placed within
a safety barrier sequence and is succeeded by another safety barrier. The SRCFcont. is not an ul-
timate barrier in this sequence. As explained in section 5.4, adding a second barrier that has the
possibility to put the machinery in a safe state after the SRCFcont. has failed, gives the oppor-
tunity to conduct repair actions on the SRCFcont.. In this case the PFH of the SRCFcont. can be
calculated from its unavailability. This introduces a certain type of operational dependability,
resulting in issues. Besides this, the fact that the SRCFcont. is not an ultimate barrier, makes that
the SFF can be calculated in the usual manor, altering the structure of the SRECS.
From these findings, the chapter explores the issue of combining a SRCFcont. and a SIS that
conducts a SIF on demand to achieve sufficient risk reduction. By means of example 5.2 it is
explained how the dependencies between a SRCFcont. and its succeeding barrier make that the
incremental adding of safety barriers (safety functions), such is described in the ISO 12100, ISO
13849 and IEC 62061, leads to design problems.
Another issue regarding combining a SRCFcont. and a SIS that conducts a SIF on demand, is
caused by the fact the SIL requirements regarding the reliability of a SRCFcont. or a safety func-
tion that acts on demand, are two different concepts. This is highlighted in section 5.6. This
makes it difficult to asses if a barrier sequence consisting out of a SRCFcont.. and a safety func-
tion that acts on demand, meet the required risk reduction expressed in SIL.
With all the design difficulties described in chapter five, chapter six explores a possible de-
sign solution. Based on the reasoning that incremental adding of barriers is not suitable when
combining a SRCFcont. with another safety barrier, an integral approach is proposed. Instead
of establishing the reliability of the SRCFcont. expressed in SIL, and use this outcome to estab-
lish what levels of risk reduction the succeeding barrier needs to deliver, it’s recommended to
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establish the frequency of a hazardous event when the full barrier sequence is implemented
(HEFBarrier sequence).
Once this is known, it can be assessed if the HEFBarrier sequence has achieved an acceptable
level or if other measures should be implemented. To establish the HEFBarrier sequence, the full
barrier sequence needs to be modelled. It is suggested to construct a Petri-net model. This
method allows to incorporate the operational dependency of conducting repair of SRECS that
conducts the SRCFcont. when the second barrier puts the machine in a safe state. A simplified
model that is constructed for a safety barrier sequence consisting out of SRCFcont. and safety
barrier that acts on demand is shown in section 6.2. A detailed model is constructed and shown
in the Appendix ’Petri-nets’. This model is made in GRIFpetri and some initial simulations are
conducted.
At the end of the project, the model does not yet include common cause failures nor is it peer
reviewed. The model is therefore not completed nor validated. Still, the model shows plausible
outcomes and results. The result seem to show that the model is functioning correct. Chapter six
ends with the proposition that with a fully validated and complete model it will not only be pos-
sible to establish the reliability of the full barrier sequence, but that optimizing the availability
with respect to the SIF test interval will also be a possibility. Once the petri-net of the SIFdemand.
is constructed and added, it is possible to vary the test interval during the simulations and find
the lowest HEF.
It can be concluded that most of the objectives that were set at the beginning of the project
are achieved. One objective that can be researched further is the second objective of the second
part; "present concepts and solutions that might be used to resolve the issues regarding safety-
functions that operate in continuous mode". The report shows a model that can be seen as a
good start towards finding a method to overcome the modelling issues that arise when design-
ing a safety barrier sequence that consists partly out of a SRECS that conducts a SRCFcont.. Due
to limited time and limited experience in modelling Petri-nets, the model has not yet been com-
pleted and validated.
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7.2 Discussion
Some of the results from the project need to be discussed. These are:
Result: The report describes and discusses the requirements for machinery and their control sys-
tem originating from the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC. It states that compliance with the Ma-
chinery Directive 2006/42/EC is of major influence on the design of machinery.
The requirements from the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC are not the only requirements from
European legislation that have to be met by machinery. It might well be that other European di-
rectives are applicable to certain machinery. Examples are:
• The Directive 94/9/EC: This directive covers equipment and protective systems intended
for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. It is to be replaced in April 2016 by the ATEX
Directive 2014/34/EU.
• The Low Voltage Directive (LVD) 2006/95/EC: This directive ensures that electrical equip-
ment within certain voltage limits provides a high level of protection for European citi-
zens, and benefits fully from the EU’s market. To be repealed in 2016 by LVD Directive
2014/35/EU.
• The Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Directive 2004/108/EC: This directive ensures
that electrical and electronic equipment does not generate, or is not affected by, electro-
magnetic disturbance.
Some of these directives dictate requirements that are almost always applicable on machinery.
That is why some of these requirements are adopted by standards such at the ISO 138491 and
the IEC 62061.
Result: Manufacturers are free to choose between using ISO 138491 or IEC 62061 during the de-
sign of their control systems. It is recommended to select the standard based on the scope of each
standard. If the system that is to be designed fits both standards, practical selection criteria can be
decisive.
Both standards are to be merged into one standard, the IEC/ISO 17305. The launch date for IEC
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ISO 17305 is planned for 2016, with a transition period of 2 years.
Result: When adding a second barrier to a SRCFcont. it introduces the possibility that, if the second
barrier puts the machine in a safe state, a repair action on the SRCFcont. can be conducted before
the hazardous event occurs. Thus, adding of a barrier is likely to increase the safety integrity of the
SRCFcont..
The decision of adding a second barrier is not a decision to take lightly. Many authors recom-
mend to increase the reliability of the first barrier before making the decision to add a succeed-
ing barrier. Common practice is to replace components with more reliable components or add
more redundancy. If the first barrier is a SRCFcont. adding redundancy might not the best option
to increase reliability. As discussed, due to the different calculation of the SFF, a system that
conduct SRCFcont. already shows more redundancy than systems that conduct safety functions
that act on demand. A hight amount of redundancy may make the system less safe. Favoring
adding a second barrier.
Result: SIL requirements regarding the reliability of a SRCFcont. and SIL requirements regard-
ing the reliability of a safety function that acts on demand, are two different concepts. This makes
it difficult to asses if a barrier sequence consisting out of a SRCFcont. and a safety function that
acts on demand, meet the required risk reduction expressed in SIL. For this reason it is proposed
to focus on the HEFBarrier sequence. The HEFBarrier sequence can then be compared with the acceptable
HEF. The acceptable HEF can be derived from the SIL the initial first barrier (SRCFcont.) requires
to meet. This is due to the fact that the PFH set for the SIL’s for continuous mode, is equal to the
maximum allowed HEF.
The concept of SIL has the advantage that through a risk assessment a SIL can be set for a cer-
tain safety function. Besides the reliability requirements, other non-quantifiable requirements
are assigned to the different SIL’s. Examples are the architectural constrains and requirements
regarding safety-related software.
In case of designing a safety barrier sequence, as proposed by the integral approach, the re-
quired risk reduction is achieved by a combination of different safety functions. The operational
dependencies within the sequence make it difficult to assign a SIL to an individual safety func-
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tion. It is therefore not possible to assign non-quantifiable requirements to the individual safety
function during the design of the barrier sequence. The report does not propose a solution to
this problem. More research should be done on this problem
7.3 Recommendations for Further Work
The project has lead to a clear description of problems concerning the design of SRCF’scont..
The proposed integral approach of designing control systems that conduct SRCF’scont. is not yet
complete and more research can be done.
• Completion and verification of the Petri-net model. The report presents a Petri-net to
model the reliability of a full barrier sequence. The model is yet to be completed and
verified. This can be done in the near future. The objectives of this work would be to:
1. Verify if the Petri-net modelling is a fitting method to assess the reliability of full bar-
rier sequences, and
2. establish if Petri-net modelling makes it possible to optimize the availability of the
barrier sequence with respect to the test interval of the safety function that acts on
demand.
• Non-quantifiable requirements to individual safety functions in the integral approach.
From the discussion it is clear that the proposed integral approach is not yet complete. On
the medium-term, work can be done on how to establish which non-quantifiable require-
ments individual safety functions in a barrier sequence need to meet. This will contribute
to developing a method specifically designed to realise safe and reliable control systems
that conduct SRCF’scont..
Appendix A
Acronyms
ALARP As low as reasonable practicable
CCF Common cause failures
CE Conformité Européenne
DC Diagnostic coverage
DD Dangerous detected failure
DOC Declaration of conformity
DU Dangerous undetected failure
EEA European Economic Area
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
ESD Emergency shut down
EU European union
EUC Equipment under control
GAMAB Globalement au moins aussi bon
HEF Hazardous event frequency
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HEFBarrier sequence Hazardous event frequency after barrier sequence is implemented
HFT Hardware fault tolerance
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LOPA Layer of protection analysis
LVD Low voltage directive
MTTF Mean time to failure
MTTFd Mean time to dangerous failure
NTNU Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PFH Probability of dangerous failure per hour.
PL Performance level
PLr Required performance level
PLC Programmable logic controller
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RBD Reliability block diagram
SFF Safe failure fraction
SIF Safety-instrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety-instrumented systems
SRCF Safety-related control function
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SRCFcont. Safety-related control function that operates in continuous mode
SRECS Safety-related electrical control systems
SRP/CS Safety-related part of a control system
Appendix B
Data
Data presented in this appendix originates from the Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented
System; PDS data Handbook, 2010 Edition.
Table B.1: Failure Data of a pressure transmitter. From
Pressure Transmitter
Lambda DU 3.00E-07
Lambda DD 5.00E-07
Lambda D 8.00E-07
Lambda SU 4.00E-07
Lambda SD 1.00E-07
Lambda S 5.00E-07
SFF incl. DD as safe 77%
SFF exl. DD as safe 38%
β 4%
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Table B.2: Failure Data of a Standard Industrial PLC. From
Standard Industrial PLC
Analog input Logic
Lambda DU 7.00E-07 Lambda DU 3.50E-06
Lambda DD 1.10E-06 Lambda DD 5.30E-06
Lambda D 1.80E-06 Lambda D 8.80E-06
Lambda SU 1.40E-06 Lambda SU 7.00E-06
Lambda SD 4.00E-07 Lambda SD 1.80E-06
Lambda S 1.80E-06 Lambda S 8.80E-06
Digital output PLC tot.
Lambda DU 7.00E-07 Structure All comp. In series
Lambda DD 1.10E-06
Lambda D 1.80E-06 Lambda DU 4.90E-06
Lambda DD 7.50E-06
Lambda SU 1.40E-06 Lambda D 1.24E-05
Lambda SD 4.00E-07
Lambda S 1.80E-06 Lambda SU 9.80E-06
Lambda SD 2.60E-06
Lambda S 1.24E-05
SFF incl. DD as safe 80%
SFF exl. DD as safe 50%
β 7%
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Table B.3: Failure Data of a Solenoid valve. From
Solenoid valve
Lambda DU 8.00E-07
Lambda DD 3.00E-07
Lambda D 1.10E-06
Lambda SU 1.70E-06
Lambda SD 2.00E-07
Lambda S 1.90E-06
SFF incl. DD as safe 73%
SFF exl. DD as safe 63%
β 10%
Appendix C
Calculations and results
This Appendix shows the models and results of the markov appraoch applied on the systems
that are described in chapter five. The average state probabilities are calculated by the GRIF
program. The PFH is calculated by the formulas presented in chapter five.
C.1 System one
The following calculations are for system one described in chapter five. The system is shown in
figure 5.3.
0 1 2 3
βD
3(1−β)λD 2(1−β)λD
βD
λD
Figure C.1: The markov model for Subsystem Sensor (pressure trans.) and Subsystem Logic
(PLC) of System one
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Table C.1: Result markov model subsystem sensors for system one
Subsystem: Sensor
Voted: 1oo3
Av. Pr. Rate to failed state Controbution to PFH(s)
State 0 0.664 3.20E-08 2.13E-08
State 1 0.287 3.20E-08 9.18E-09
State 2 0.041 8.00E-07 3.31E-08
PFH(s) 6.35E-08
Table C.2: Result markov model subsystem Logic for system one
Subsystem: plc
Voted: 1oo3
Av. Pr. Rate to failed state Controbution to PFH(lg)
State 0 0.670 8.68E-07 5.81E-07
State 1 0.280 8.68E-07 2.43E-07
State 2 0.039 1.24E-05 4.83E-07
PFH(g) 1.31E-06
0 1 2 3
βD
3(1−β)λD 2(1−β)λD
βD
λD
Figure C.2: The markov model for Subsystem Sensor (pressure trans.) and Subsystem Logic
(PLC) of System one
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Table C.3: Description of states accompanying the markov model shown in Figure C.2
State Description Critical
0 All sensors/PLC OK If CCF
1 One sensor/PC D, two OK If CCF
2 Two sensors/PLC D, one OK Yes
3 All sensors/PLC D Failed
Table C.4: Result markov model subsystem final elements for system one
Subsystem: Solenoid valves
Voted: 1oo2
Av. Pr. Rate to failed state Controbution to PFH(fe)
State 0 0.693 1.10E-07 7.63E-08
State 1 0.263 1.10E-06 2.89E-07
PFH(g) 3.65E-07
0 1 2
βD
2(1−β)λD λD
Figure C.3: The markov model for Subsystem Final Element (Solenoid valves) of System one
Table C.5: Description of states accompanying the markov model shown in Figure C.3
State Description Critical
0 All valves OK If CCF
1 One valve D, one OK Yes
2 Two valves D, Failed
Appendix D
Petri-nets
This Appendix presents the petri-nets that are constructed in GRIF-petri and are discussed in
chapter six.
Table D.1: Data used for simulation
Transitions Value
λDDsensor 5.00E-07
λDUsensor 3.00E-07
µDDsensor 0.125
µDUsensor 0.1
λDDPLC 7.50E-06
λDUPLC 4.90E-06
µDDPLC 0.125
µDUPLC 0.1
λDDValve 3.00E-07
λDUValve 8.00E-07
µDDValve 0.125
µDUValve 0.1
PFDSIF 5.00E-02
Table D.2: Simulation information
Simulation
Time(τ) 20 years (175200 hours)
Histories 8E6
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Table D.3: Legend of Petri-Net for the subsystems, places
Place Description
P.DD.w.chi Channel i is working with respect to the DD
P.DD.f.chi Channel i has failed with respect to the DD
P.DU.w.chi Channel i is working with respect to the DU
P.DU.f.chi Channel i has failed with respect to the DU
P.chi.w Channel i is working
P.chi .f Channel i has failed
Group.F Group (Subsystem) has failed
SS Machinery is put into Safe State after failure of Group
Table D.4: Legend of Petri-Net for the subsystems, transitions
Transition Description
DDchi Channel i fails with respect to DD with failure rate DD
rr.DD.chi Channel i is repaired with respect to DD, with repair rate DD
DUchi Channel i fails with respect to DU with failure rate DU
rr.DU.chi Channel i is repaired with respect to DU, with repair rate DU
DU.F.chi Channel i fails with respect to DU
DD.F.chi Channel i fails with respect to DD
DD.R.chi Channel i is repaired with resect to DD
DU.R.chi Channel i is repaired with respect to DU
f.Group Group fails
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Figure D.1: Petri-net of a 1oo2 voted group, sensor
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Figure D.2: Petri-net of a 1oo2 voted group, PLC
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Figure D.3: Petri-net of a 1oo2 voted group, valves
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Table D.5: Legend of Petri-Net for the interaction between barriers, places
Place Description
Pl.138 Subsystem sensors has failed
Pl.137 Subsystem logic has failed
Pl.122 Subsystem valves has failed
Pl.135 SRCP has failed
P.HEF Hazardous event
Pl.131 Machine is in safe state after failure of the SRCF
Table D.6: Legend of Petri-Net for the interaction between barriers, transitions
Transition Description
Tr.296 Subsystem sensors fails
Tr.295 Subsystem logic fails
Tr. 381 Subsystem valves fails
Tr. 299 Second barrier fails with certrain probability, fires toke to P.HEF or Pl.131
Tr. 382 Repair of subsystem sensor if machine is put into safe state
Tr. 383 Repair of subsystem logic if machine is put into safe state
Tr. 385 Repair of subsystem valve if machine is put into safe state
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Figure D.4: Petri-net of interaction between subsystems. (Incl. PFD SIF)
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Table D.7: Result of simulation, places
Name Number Sojourn Time σ (Sojourn Time) Average token number σ (Average) Token number at end of history σ (end of history)
P.DD.w.ch1.Sensor 1 175199.3175 3.301627118 0.999996104 1.88449E-05 0.9999965 0.001870826
P.DD.f.ch1.Sensor 2 0.682524624 3.301627118 3.89569E-06 1.88449E-05 0.0000035 0.001870826
P.DU.w.ch1.Sensor 3 170928.5541 21764.39155 0.975619601 0.124225979 0.953083 0.211461109
P.DU.f.ch1.Sensor 4 4271.445903 21764.39155 0.024380399 0.124225979 0.046917 0.211461109
P.ch1.w.Sensor 5 170927.8716 21764.30578 0.975615705 0.12422549 0.9530795 0.211468608
P.ch1.f.Sensor 6 4272.128427 21764.30578 0.024384295 0.12422549 0.0469205 0.211468608
P.DD.w.ch2.Sensor 7 175199.3166 3.308489664 0.999996099 1.88841E-05 0.999996375 0.00190394
P.DD.f.ch2.Sensor 8 0.683437053 3.308489664 3.9009E-06 1.88841E-05 3.625E-06 0.00190394
P.DU.w.ch2.Sensor 9 170928.1759 21766.01416 0.975617443 0.124235241 0.95307725 0.211473429
P.DU.f.ch2.Sensor 10 4271.824064 21766.01416 0.024382557 0.124235241 0.04692275 0.211473429
P.ch2.w.Sensor 11 170927.4925 21765.9284 0.975613542 0.124234751 0.953073625 0.211481195
P.ch2.f.Sensor 12 4272.507501 21765.9284 0.024386458 0.124234751 0.046926375 0.211481195
Group.F.Sensor 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
SS.sensor 27 0.260136521 144.3525002 1.89847E-06 0.00115014 0.000004 0.002345205
ex.r.DU.Sensor 31 175200 0 1 0 1 0
P.DD.w.ch1.plc 32 175191.2554 12.064051 0.999950088 6.88587E-05 0.999956375 0.006604779
P.DD.f.ch1.plc 33 8.744623694 12.064051 4.99122E-05 6.88587E-05 0.000043625 0.006604779
P.DU.w.ch1.plc 34 145693.1244 43253.9629 0.83158176 0.24688335 0.777898 0.415659384
P.DU.f.ch1.plc 35 29506.87565 43253.9629 0.16841824 0.24688335 0.222102 0.415659384
P.ch1.w.plc 36 145684.3797 43251.5876 0.831531848 0.246869792 0.777854375 0.415688547
P.ch1.f.plc 37 29515.62027 43251.5876 0.168468152 0.246869792 0.222145625 0.415688547
P.DD.w.ch2.plc 38 175191.2635 12.05857163 0.999950134 6.88275E-05 0.999954625 0.006735944
P.DD.f.ch2.plc 39 8.73653111 12.05857163 4.9866E-05 6.88275E-05 0.000045375 0.006735944
P.DU.w.ch2.plc 40 145708.3601 43225.26777 0.831668722 0.246719565 0.77808175 0.415536475
P.DU.f.ch2.plc 41 29491.63989 43225.26777 0.168331278 0.246719565 0.22191825 0.415536475
P.ch2.w.plc 42 145699.6236 43222.89872 0.831618856 0.246706043 0.778036375 0.415566837
P.ch2.f.plc 43 29500.37642 43222.89872 0.168381144 0.246706043 0.221963625 0.415566837
Group.F.plc 48 0 0 0 0 0 0
SS.plc 58 19.60899632 1150.031098 0.000123487 0.007044537 0.000206375 0.015710902
ex.r.DU.plc 62 175200 0 1 0 1 0
P.DD.w.ch1.valve 63 175199.6048 2.513019188 0.999997745 1.43437E-05 0.999997625 0.001541102
P.DD.f.ch1.valve 64 0.395153989 2.513019188 2.25545E-06 1.43437E-05 0.000002375 0.001541102
P.DU.w.ch1.valve 65 164625.6362 33343.34118 0.939644042 0.190315874 0.8878325 0.315572439
P.DU.f.ch1.valve 66 10574.36376 33343.34118 0.060355958 0.190315874 0.1121675 0.315572439
P.ch1.w.valve 67 164625.2411 33343.26211 0.939641787 0.190315423 0.887830125 0.315575358
P.ch1.f.valve 68 10574.75891 33343.26211 0.060358213 0.190315423 0.112169875 0.315575358
P.DD.w.ch2.valve 69 175199.6043 2.516587252 0.999997741 1.43641E-05 0.999996875 0.001767764
P.DD.f.ch2.valve 70 0.395730768 2.516587252 2.25874E-06 1.43641E-05 0.000003125 0.001767764
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Table D.8: Cont. result places of Table D.7
Name Number Sojourn Time σ (Sojourn Time) Average token number σ (Average) Token number at end of history σ (end of history)
P.DU.w.ch2.valve 71 164616.9609 33345.88576 0.939594526 0.190330398 0.887720875 0.315709575
P.DU.f.ch2.valve 72 10583.0391 33345.88576 0.060405474 0.190330398 0.112279125 0.315709575
P.ch2.w.valve 73 164616.5652 33345.80711 0.939592267 0.190329949 0.88771775 0.315713412
P.ch2.f.valve 74 10583.43483 33345.80711 0.060407733 0.190329949 0.11228225 0.315713412
Group.F.valve 79 0 0 0 0 0 0
SS.valve 89 0.607560995 178.2925979 5.20627E-06 0.001957785 0.000012 0.005147801
ex.r.DU.valve 93 175200 0 1 0 1 0
Pl122 122 78.96723914 2580.130897 0.000457615 0.015070882 0.0013895 0.038151926
P.HEF 130 2652.205423 16039.4829 0.015490047 0.094814902 0.0380405 0.197517531
Pl131 131 32.54860485 1491.545985 0.000265552 0.013944095 0.001151 0.04817339
Pl135 135 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pl136 136 24.16805559 1430.429695 0.000139611 0.008301548 0.00043175 0.0211557
Pl137 137 1584.678131 10652.83133 0.0093276 0.064163749 0.0189035 0.144314449
Table D.9: Result of simulation, transitions
Name ID Number of triggers during period Name ID Number of triggers during period Name ID Number of triggers during period
DDch1.Sensor 1 0.085426375 Tr40 40 0.491627125 DD.R.ch1.valve 79 0.068933125
rr.DD.ch1.Sensor 2 0.085422875 DU.F.ch.1.plc 41 0.713729125 DU.R.ch1.valve 80 0.0845432125
DUch1.Sensor 3 0.05139325 DD.F.ch.1.plc 42 1.09297325 DDch2.valve 81 0.049426375
rr.DU.ch1.Sensor 4 0.00447625 DD.R.ch1.plc 43 1.58455675 rr.DD.ch2.valve 82 0.04942325
DU.F.ch1.Sensor 5 0.05139325 DU.R.ch1.plc 44 0.04139521 DUch2.valve 83 0.1317465
DD.F.ch.1.Sensor 6 0.085426375 Tr45 45 1.091777125 rr.DU.ch2.valve 84 0.019467375
DD.R.ch1.Sensor 7 0.089899125 Tr46 46 1.09173175 DU.F.ch2.valve 85 0.1317465
DU.R.ch1.Sensor 8 0.08236325 Tr47 47 0.71391025 DD.F.ch2.valve 86 0.049426375
DDch2.Sensor 9 0.085466875 Tr48 48 0.491992 DD.R.ch2.valve 87 0.068890625
rr.DDch2.Sensor 10 0.08546325 DU.F.ch.2.plc 49 0.71391025 DU.R.ch2.valve 88 0.065840514
DUch2.Sensor 11 0.051391625 DD.F.ch.2.plc 50 1.091777125 f.Group.valve 97 0.023376625
rr.DU.ch2.Sensor 12 0.004468875 DD.R.ch2.plc 51 1.58372375 r.DU.valve 108 0.01703875
DU.F.ch2.Sensor 13 0.051391625 DU.R.ch2.plc 52 0.723459254 Tr295 295 0.731896375
DD.F.ch1.Sensor 14 0.085466875 f.Group.plc 61 0.731896375 Tr296 296 0.006829375
DD.R.ch2.Sensor 15 0.089932125 r.DU.plc 72 0.28923325 Tr299 299 0.762102375
DU.R.ch2.Sensor 16 0.076943642 DDch1.valve 73 0.049444625 Tr381 381 0.023376625
f.Group.Sensors 25 0.006829375 rr.DD.ch1.valve 74 0.04944225 Tr382 382 0.006387125
r.DU.Sensor 36 0.002562 DUch1.valve 75 0.131658375 Tr383 383 0.69459225
Tr37 37 1.09297325 rr.DU.ch1.valve 76 0.019490875 Tr384 384 4.0684595
Tr38 38 1.092929625 DU.F.ch1.valve 77 0.131658375 Tr385 385 0.0219315
Tr39 39 0.713729125 DD.F.ch.1.valve 78 0.049444625 Tr386 386 8.100256
Tr387 387 7.4797255
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